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The Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence is, perhaps,
the surest example of the "federalization" of an area of law that
federalism principles dictate traditionally belongs to the states.'
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court developed a
preemption doctrine that effectively precludes states from
regulating arbitration because the Court nullifies state laws or
judicial decisions that are inconsistent with either the policy
underlying or the language of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). 2 As a result, enforcement of state laws regulating
t John W. Bricker Professor of Law. Many thanks to my research assistant, Daniel
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project has been unwavering.
1 The federalization of arbitration law seems especially surprising because the
Court is reputed to be leading a federalism revival. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky,
Reconceptualizing Federalism, 50 NYU L Rev 729 (2005) (examining the inconsistency of
the Supreme Court's federalism revival in the context of numerous pro-preemption
decisions); David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the
FAA's Encroachment on State Law, in The Privatization of Justice? Mandatory
Arbitration and the State Courts, Report of the 2003 Forum for State Appellate Court
Judges 47, 48 (Pound Civil Justice Institute 2003) (same). See also Norman W.
Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the
Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum L Rev 1992, 2006-14 (2003) (tracing the
federalism revival's roots in the Rehnquist Court).
2 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub L No 68-401, 43 Stat 883 (1925), codified at 9 USC
§ 1 et seq. See, for example, Doctor's Associates v Casarotto, 517 US 681 (1996); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos, Inc v Dobson, 513 US 265 (1995); Perry v Thomas, 482 US 483
(1987); Southland Corp v Keating, 465 US 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v
Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co, 388 US 395 (1967). In the preface to the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (RUAA), drafters explained the Supreme Court's approach to preemption in the
following way: "That body of case law establishes that state law of any ilk, including
adaptations of the RUAA, mooting or limiting contractual agreements to arbitrate must
yield to the pro-arbitration public policy voiced in Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA." See
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Arbitration Act
*2 (2000), online at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration
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arbitration became the exception rather than the rule. In the
2009-2011 terms, the Court took arbitral preemption a step
further, extending its preemption doctrine to "second
generation" arbitration cases.3 These second generation cases
involve state court or legislative attempts to regulate in areas
that the FAA does not specifically address, such as
enforceability or review issues.4 Perhaps surprisingly, the Court
did not hesitate to extend preemption to one of these second
generation cases in AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion.5 In that
case, the Court held that federal arbitration law preempted a
California state court decision holding an arbitration agreement
unconscionable because it precluded consumers from pursuing a
class action in court or arbitration. 6 Concepcion, together with
the Court's holding during the previous term in Stolt-Nielsen SA
v AnimalFeeds International Corp,7 which held that arbitrators
could not order class arbitration unless the parties agreed to it,8
expanded the federal domination of arbitration law into areas
the FAA does not address. In doing so, the Court created an
expanded preemption doctrine that appears to preclude any
state regulation or judicial decision that conflicts with the
Court's vaguely articulated notion of what arbitration is.
Consequently, the Court's decisions have effectively eliminated
the states' ability to regulate the arbitration process to improve
final_00.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
Professor Christopher Drahozal first coined the term "second generation" cases to
describe this type of arbitration case. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 Ind L J 393 (2004).
4 Additional examples of issues the FAA does not address include arbitration
discovery, arbitrator disclosure requirements, class action arbitration, and arbitrators'
power to order punitive damages.
131 S Ct 1740 (2011).
Id at 1748-53.
130 S Ct 1758 (2010).
See id at 1775-76. Note that Stolt-Nielsen involved two repeat players with
relatively equal bargaining power, not a consumer and a business. Although Justice
Ginsburg in dissent expressed hope that the Stolt-Nielsen decision would not apply in a
consumer dispute, the dominant interpretation suggests that her hopes are not well-
founded. See id at 1783. For discussion of Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Stolt-Nielsen, see,
for example, Jean Sternlight, Sternlight on AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (ADR Prof Blog
Nov 9, 2010), online at http://www.indisputably.orgp-1842 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
Courts are likely to require arbitrators in a consumer dispute, like arbitrators in a
business dispute, to point either to the parties' contract or to some law justifying the
arbitrators' decision to order a class arbitration before the court will uphold an
arbitrator's decision to send the dispute to class arbitration.
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the fairness to the one-shot player, such as the consumer.9 The
Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen decisions would seem to complete
the process of federalizing arbitration law.
During this same time frame and perhaps in response to the
Supreme Court's wholesale endorsement of arbitration,
businesses expanded their arbitration agreements to include the
consumers to whom they sell products.10 In response, consumer
9 And, as a practical matter, the Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen decisions also
sounded a death knell for consumers attempting to pursue low-value claims against
businesses because Congress refuses to address the issue and states can no longer
effectively address it.
10 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744 (describing AT&T Mobility's arbitration
agreement); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 Or L Rev 703, 717 (2012) (comparing studies showing the large
increase in the adoption of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts since 2001).
Following Concepcion, Playstation, eBay, Xbox, Netflix, and Paypal amended their
arbitration agreements to preclude class processes. See Chris Morran, Sony Changes
PS3 Terms of Service to Avoid Class Action Lawsuits, Consumerist (Sept 16, 2011),
online at http: //consumerist.com/201 1/09/16/sony-changes-ps3 -terms-of-service-to-avoid-
class-action-lawsuits/ (visited Sept 15, 2013); Chris Morran, Paypal Slips Forced
Arbitration Clause Into User Agreement; Gives Users Until Dec. 1 to Opt Out,
Consumerist (Oct. 9, 2012), online at http: //consumerist.com/2012/10/09/paypal-slips-
forced-arbitration-clause-into-user-agreement-gives-you-until-dec-1-to-opt-out/ (visited
Sept 15, 2013) (reporting that both Paypal and Ebay adopted class action waivers in
their arbitration clauses following Concepcion); Matt Brownell, Netflix is Now Banning
Class-Action Suits Too, www.mainstreet.com (Mar 20, 2012), online at
http: //www.mainstreet.com/article/smart-spending/technology/netflix-now-banning-class-
action-suits-too (visited Sept 15, 2013) (reporting that Xbox and Netflix adopted class
action and class arbitration waivers following Concepcion). Wireless phone companies,
banks, computer sellers, and cable companies routinely integrate arbitration agreements
with class arbitration waivers in their boilerplate language in contracts with consumers.
Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, and T-Mobile use class action waivers in their customer
arbitration agreements. For the T-Mobile wireless contract, see http: /www.t-mobile.com/
Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset=FtrFtrTermsAndConditions&print=true (visited Sept
15, 2013). For the Sprint terms, see https: /manage.sprintpcs.com/output/enUS/
manage/MyPhoneandPlan/ChangePlans/popLegalTermsPrivacy.htm (visited Sept 15,
2013). For the Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement, see http://www.verizonwireless.
com/b2c /globalText?textName=CUSTOMER AGREEMENT&jspName=footer/customerA
greement.jsp (visited Sept 15, 2013). For the AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, see
http: lwww.wireless.att.com/1earn/articles-resources/wireless-terms.jsp (visited Sept 15,
2013). See also Zachary Gima, Taylor Lincoln, and David Arkush, Forced Arbitration:
Unfair and Everywhere, Public Citizen 10, 14, 16 (Sept 2009) (showing that five out of
seven banks, four out of ten computer manufacturers, and six out of thirteen cable
providers use arbitration clauses in their contracts). Professors Chris Drahozal and
Peter Rutledge are undertaking a comprehensive study of the impact of the Concepcion
decision on businesses' use of class action waivers in franchise arbitration clauses. Until
that study is complete, the best evidence seems to be anecdotal. One of the best-known
companies to adopt a class action waiver in their consumer arbitration clauses is
Microsoft. In June 2012, Microsoft announced that it was revising its consumer contracts
to add class action waivers. According to Microsoft, consumers may pursue low-value
disputes individually in either small claims court or arbitration, but will not be able to
aggregate them with other similarly-situated consumers. See David Lazarus, Microsoft
Pulls Plug on Class Actions, LA Times B1 (June 8, 2012). The article describes Microsoft
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advocacy groups and others" increased the attack on arbitration
as a process for achieving justice. 12 This attack is based
primarily on the view that arbitration does not provide a fair
process or results to one-shot players, 13 like consumers, who play
little or no role in negotiating the underlying arbitration
agreement and whose lack of knowledge hampers their ability to
as part of a post-Concepcion business trend to eliminate consumer class actions: "That
trend kicked into high gear after the high court ruled in a 5-4 decision last year that
businesses can require arbitration-and prohibit class-action lawsuits-in their service
contracts. The decision specifically involved AT&T but applies to all companies in all
industries." Id. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin,
Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U Mich J L Ref 871, 886 (2008) (finding clauses
providing for mandatory arbitration in 92.9 percent of employment contracts and 76.9
percent of consumer contracts); Linda J. Demaine and Deborah R. Hensler,
"Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average
Consumer's Experience, 67 L & Contemp Probs 55, 62-64 (2004) (examining a mix of
industries and finding that 35.4 percent of consumer contracts contained an arbitration
clause, compared to 69.2 percent of financial services contracts containing such a clause);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 NC L Rev 931, 933-36 (1999) (discussing the expansion of arbitration
into consumer agreements in relation to Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence);
Edward Brunet, et al, Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment 129
(Cambridge 2006) (discussing the expansion of arbitration agreements into every day
consumer transactions with financial institutions, service providers, and sellers of
goods); Lauren Gaffney, The Circle of Assent: How 'Agreement" Can Save Mandatory
Arbitration in Long-Term Care Contracts, 62 Vand L Rev 1017, 1019 (2009) (noting that
mandatory arbitration of disputes has become the norm in long-term care contracts);
Mark Furletti, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Credit Card Industry *3-4 (Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2003), online at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-
cards-center/events/workshops/2003/MandatoryArbitrationClauses_012003.pdf (visited
Sept 15, 2013) (noting the adoption of arbitration clauses by the credit card industry);
Consumer Action, Arbitration Clauses Prevalent *5 (Consumer Action News Spring
2007), online at http://www.consumer-action.org/downloads/englishlCA _NewsCC_07.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013) (finding that 75 percent of surveyed cards required consumers to
settle disputes in arbitration).
n See, for example, Gutting Class Action, NY Times A26 (May 12, 2011).
12 For the Public Citizen discussion of Arbitration, see http://www.citizen.org/
Page.aspx?pid=397 (visited Sept 15, 2013). For the National Association of Consumer
Advocates (NACA) discussion of Forced Arbitration, see http://www.naca.net/issues/
forced-arbitration (visited Sept 15, 2013). Both sites contain links to various reports and
stories that illustrate this point. More recently, a new advocacy group formed the
Consumers Count Litigation Group. This group, currently soliciting consumers to join
prospective class actions, exists to challenge the use of arbitration to resolve consumer
disputes. See Consumers Count website, online at http://www.consumerscount.org
(visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Browse. Submit. Act. Are You Outraged? Did It Happen To You?
You Build The Crowd, We'll Make The Case.").
13 A "one-shot" player is at a systematic disadvantage in an arbitration against a
"repeat" player. Repeat players have advantages in drafting arbitration agreements,
selecting arbitrators, and the arbitration itself. See Sarah R. Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees, 64 UJMKC L Rev 449, 472-79 (1996).
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participate in any aspect of the arbitral process from arbitrator
selection to the hearing. Most damning may be the attacks of
public interest groups against the cadre of arbitrators who hear
these types of cases. 14 Criticized as partial to the groups paying
them, arbitrators and their defenders can only argue, but not
prove, that they act impartially when deciding a case. In the
absence of evidence supporting their claims, arbitrators and the
organizations for whom they work have difficulty debunking
critical views of their work.15
States' inability to regulate arbitration agreements or
awards, together with Congress's reluctance to amend the
FAA,16 led in part, to the creation of a federal agency, the
14 See, for example, Consumer Action, Dodd-Frank Act Calls for Study of Binding
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, Consumer Action Insider (Consumer Action Aug
2012), online at http://www.consumer-action.org/news/articles/consumeraction-insider
august 2012/ (visited Sept 15, 2013) (suggesting arbitrators do not always follow the law
and give preferential treatment to corporations that hire them repeatedly).
15 Additional empirical research on consumer arbitration's effectiveness may be
forthcoming. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), as part of its study of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving consumer financial products or services,
put out a call for information on how arbitration is used in this context. See Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and
Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements 77 Fed Reg
25148, 25148 (2012).
16 See, for example, congressional attempts to amend the FAA to make pre-dispute
arbitration agreements unenforceable in employment, consumer, and civil rights
contexts: A Bill to Amend title 9, United States Code, to allow employees the right to
accept or reject the use of arbitration to resolve an employment controversy, HR 815,
107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec H 621 (daily ed Mar 01, 2001); Preservation of
Civil Rights Protections Act of 2001, HR 2282, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec H
3464 (daily ed June 21, 2001); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2002, S
2435, 107th Cong, 2d Sess, in 148 Cong Rec S 3625 (daily ed May 1, 2002); Fairness and
Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, HR
3809, 108th Cong, 2d Sess, in 150 Cong Rec H 514 (daily ed Feb 11, 2004); Preservation
of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2005, HR 2969, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec
H 4721 (daily ed June 17, 2005); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, HR 3010, 110th Cong,
1st Sess, in 153 Cong Rec H 7774 (daily ed July 12, 2007); Civil Rights Act of 2008, HR
5129, 110th Cong, 2d Sess, in 154 Cong Rec H 454 (daily ed Jan 23, 2008); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, S 931, 111th Cong, 1st Sess, in 155 Cong Rec S 4891 (daily ed Apr
29, 2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, HR 1873, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong
Rec H 3278 (daily ed May 12, 2011). Although some of the early bills were responses to
the use of arbitration to resolve statutory employment discrimination claims, drafters
offered protection from arbitration to consumers as well. See, for example, Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2011, HR 1873, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, 156 Cong Rec H 3278 (daily ed
May 12, 2011). In addition, legislators proposed amendments to various statutes, such as
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, that would have had the same effect. See, for
example, Consumer Fairness Act of 2003, HR 1887, 108th Cong, 1st Sess, in 149 Cong
Rec H 3570 (daily ed Apr 30, 2003). Almost none of these bills were reported out of
committee, and those that survived the committee step of the legislative process were
not voted on by the House or Senate.
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).17 The agency
has broad authority to enforce consumer protection laws and
protect the general welfare of consumers in their interactions
with different financial institutions.18 One of the CFPB's
initiatives is to study the use of arbitration in disputes between
consumers and financial services providers to determine
whether arbitration is an appropriate mechanism for resolution
of these disputes.19 While the CFPB's study is in the very early
stages and may ultimately have little impact on arbitration,20
the irony is that a federal agency, rather than a state
legislature, is now the only entity capable of reforming
arbitration. 21
The Supreme Court's anti-federalism approach to
arbitration precludes states from engaging in the kind of
democratic experimentation 22  with different regulatory
" See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 2003-04 (2010), codified at 12 USC § 5301 et seq
(authorizing the newly formed Consumer Credit Protection Agency to prohibit or impose
conditions or limitations on the use of arbitrations between a consumer and a financial
services provider). The Dodd-Frank Act allows limitations on arbitration if the Director
of the Consumer Credit Protection Agency determines, after conducting a formal study of
the use of binding arbitration agreements in the financial services industry, that such
limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of consumers. Id.
1s See Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U Chi L Rev 623, 654 (2012).
19 Id at 656 (detailing how § 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the CFPB to
conduct a study of arbitration in consumer transactions and submit its findings to
Congress).
20 Id at 658 (noting that any contracts entered into before 180 days after the
agency's determination would not be affected by the new regulations).
21 Id at 656 (noting that after its study is completed, the CFPB could partially
overturn Concepcion by banning class action waivers in the specific context of consumer
financial products).
22 A key attribute of federalism is that it enables states to serve as "laboratories for
experimentation" in social policy. See Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 342 (2003),
interpreting United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy concurring)
(stating that states should be able to "draw on the most promising aspects" of other
states' experimental approaches to affirmative action); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452,
458 (1991) (noting that the federalism system provides for "innovation and
experimentation" in government); David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of
Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act's Encroachment on State Law, 16 Wash
U J L & Pol 129, 130-31 (2004). Professor Schwartz notes that FAA preemption "stifles
state law 'experimentation' not only by nullifying state laws on the books, but also by
discouraging proposals to change the law." Id at 134. See also Jack Wilson, 'Wo-Class-
Action Arbitration Clauses," State-Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration
Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 Quinnipiac L
Rev 737, 814-15 (2004) (arguing that forcing state courts to defer to the FAA's vague
federal policy on class action arbitration is inferior to allowing state legislatures to
address the issue); Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in
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approaches that federalism typically encourages and that,
generally, results in well-considered solutions to existing
problems. 23 This approach may be especially problematic for
consumer arbitration because there is relatively little empirical
evidence to support arguments for or against the use of
arbitration in this context. If state legislatures were permitted
to experiment with different methods for regulating arbitration,
focusing on several areas might prove fruitful-reexamination of
class action arbitration as a process for adjudicating consumers'
low-value claims, expansion of transcript and opinion-writing
requirements, and reexamination of arbitrator selection
processes, among others. 24 Though they might prefer
eliminating pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements
entirely, scholarly commentators tend to agree that if businesses
continue to use arbitration, additional due process protections
are necessary so that parties will be more likely to accept
arbitration as a primary means for resolving disputes. 25 In light
Arbitration, 8 Nev L J 326, 329-31 (2007) (noting that arbitration law is a species of
contract and consumer law and, therefore, states are better suited to addressing its
issues than is the federal government).
23 As the Court stated in Gregory v Ashcroft,
[F]ederalist structure ... assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government
more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.
501 US at 458.
24 Professors Stephen Hayford and Alan Palmiter recommend a similar approach.
Rather than rejoin "at the state level the battles lost before the Supreme Court," the
authors recommended that state legislatures try to fill in the gaps on the many arbitral
matters the FAA did not address. Stephen L. Hayford and Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration
Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 Fla L Rev 175, 226-27 (2002).
The authors would probably be surprised that the Court has since taken the view that
even the effort to fill in the gaps the FAA appeared to leave wide open can be preempted.
See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753. At this point, the Court seems to reject Hayford and
Palmiter's view that the RUAA and other state legislative acts could serve an important
role in assuring the fundamental fairness of arbitration.
25 See, for example, Amy Schmitz, Regulation Rash? Questioning the AFA's
Approach for Protecting Arbitration Fairness, 28 Bank & Fin Serv Pol Rep 16, 19 (2009)
(asserting that the need for some reform of arbitration, particularly in the consumer
context, must be balanced against the importance of avoiding "needless protectionism").
Professor Schmitz also proposes arbitration reforms like notice of the arbitration clause,
balanced arbitrator selection, contained costs, adequate discovery, convenient hearing
location, timeliness and compliance with awards, preservation of statutory remedies,
public disclosure of awards, access to small claims court, and allowance of class relief. Id
at 23-29. See also Richard D. Fincher, et al, An Examination of the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009 *7, 85-87 (Association of Conflict Resolution Dec 1, 2009), online at
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of the Court's current approach to arbitral preemption and
Congress's lack of interest in amending the FAA, it may well be
that private dispute resolution providers, rather than state
legislatures, 26  will ultimately provide the laboratory for
experimentation.
This Article recognizes the reality that arbitration is not
going anywhere. 27 Those who contend that it provides second
http://www.acrnet.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/FinalReport%201
2 -1-09.pdf (visited
Sept 15, 2013) (recommending improving the process and procedures provided in pre-
dispute arbitration agreements instead of "disenfranchis[ing]" one-shot players from
utilizing an "affordable, viable, fair dispute resolution process to resolve their disputes in
a timely manner"). Lew Maltby drafted the Model Arbitration Act, which he proposes as
an alternative to the AFA and which codifies many of Schmitz's recommendations.
Maltby's Act includes a mandate that consumers pay limited fees, and have a right to a
neutral provider and a written opinion, if requested. See Lew Maltby, Model Arbitration
Act *1-2 (unpublished proposed Act) (on file with author). See also Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion
and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 Am Rev Intl Arb 323, 427-29 (2011)
(recommending a statutory amendment of the FAA that provides "due process
standards" to circumvent unconscionability, specifically the limitation of class-action
waivers and a mechanism for independent administration of the arbitration processes);
Richard A. Bales and Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal
Arbitration Act, 113 Pa St L Rev 1081, 1100-01 (2009) (proposing that consumer
arbitration be invalid unless, among other requirements, there is a jointly selected
arbitrator, adequate discovery, cost splitting, a right to representation, a right to a class
action, a right to a written opinion, and a right to limited judicial review).
26 The RUAA drafters, without the benefit of cases like Hall Street Associates LLC v
Mattel Inc, 552 US 576 (2008), Concepcion, and Stolt-Nielsen, read the preemption tea
leaves as follows:
It is likely that matters not addressed in the FAA are also open to regulation
by the States. State law provisions regulating purely procedural dimensions of
the arbitration process (e.g., discovery [RUAA Section 17], consolidation of
claims [RUAA Section 10], and arbitrator immunity [RUAA Section 14]) likely
will not be subject to preemption. Less certain is the effect of FAA preemption
with regard to substantive issues like the authority of arbitrators to award
punitive damages (RUAA Section 21) and the standards for arbitrator
disclosure of potential conflicts of interest (RUAA Section 12) that have a
significant impact on the integrity and/or the adequacy of the arbitration
process. These "borderline" issues are not purely procedural in nature but
unlike the "front end" and "back end" issues they do not go to the essence of the
agreement to arbitrate or effectuation of the arbitral result. Although there is
no concrete guidance in the case law, preemption of state law dealing with such
matters seems unlikely as long as it cannot be characterized as anti-arbitration
or as intended to limit the enforceability or viability of agreements to arbitrate.
See Uniform Arbitration Act at *5 (cited in note 2).
27 In November 2012, Professor Jill Gross asked Supreme Court Justice Sonia
Sotomayor whether she believed that the Court would change its approach to arbitration
cases in the near future. See Jill Gross, Justice Sotomayor on Arbitration, (ADR Prof
Blog Nov 12, 2012), online at http://www.indisputably.orgp-4116 (visited Sept 15,
2013). Justice Sotomayor responded that she did not believe the Court would alter its
approach to arbitration cases and that those interested in reform should look to the
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class justice, 28 will result in the complete takeover of vast areas
of the law,2 9 or will result in law ossification, need to realize that
the Supreme Court's approach to arbitral preemption requires
those interested in the issue to do what can be done to make the
process more effective for all parties, rather than continue to
attack it as an inadequate forum for resolution of consumer
disputes. Improvements in the arbitration process will make a
process that is already fair to consumers more acceptable to
them.30 Recent studies demonstrate that arbitrators take their
jobs very seriously.31 They cite law, follow precedent, think like
judges and, in short, do everything necessary to provide justice
to those who select them. 32 Rather than turn to the anecdote of
private sector or the legislature for change. See id. Justice Sotomayor's comments were
prescient as the Supreme Court continued along its path of arbitration federalization in
American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S Ct 2304 (2013). In that case,
the Court decided that merchants could not join together in a class arbitration to pursue
their antitrust claims based on the claim that bilateral arbitration would not permit
them to vindicate their statutory rights. Rejecting the merchants' claim that the expert
analysis necessary to support an antitrust claim would make bilateral arbitration too
expensive for an individual merchant to pursue, the Court held that the individual
merchant's right to pursue a remedy is not eliminated simply because it must be pursued
in the arbitration forum, even if the individual ultimately decides not to pursue the
claim because it is too expensive to do so. The American Express decision eliminates the
claim that a class arbitration waiver contained in an arbitration agreement precludes
the individual, whether consumer or other one-shot player, from effectively vindicating
his or her statutory rights.
28 See, for example, Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash U L Q 637, 677-97 (1996)
(debunking the argument that binding arbitration serves all parties' best interests);
Stephan Landsman, Nothing for Something? Denying Legal Assistance to Those
Compelled to Participate in ADR Proceedings, 37 Fordham Urban L J 273, 279 (2010)
(suggesting that Congress's 1988 authorization of mandatory federal court ADR
programs implicitly confirmed the "second-class justice" of compulsory arbitration).
29 See Sternlight, 74 Wash U L Q at 677-97 (cited in note 28); Landsman, 37
Fordham Urban L J at 279 (cited in note 28).
3 For example, a recent survey indicated that nine out of ten consumers disapprove
of mandatory arbitration, albeit in the consumer finance sector. The Pew Charitable
Trusts, Banking on Arbitration: Big Banks, Consumers and Checking Account Dispute
Resolution *6 (The Pew Charitable Trusts Nov 27, 2012), online at http://www.
pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS Assets/2012/Pew arbitration report.pdf (visited on
Sept 15, 2013). See also Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Can public count on fair
arbitration?, San Francisco Chronicle A15 (Oct 8, 2001).
31 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create
Precedent, 90 NC L Rev 1091, 1093 (2012); Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us
about Labor Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 46 U Mich J L Ref *48
(forthcoming 2013), online at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2020740## (visited Sept 15, 2013).
32 See Michael H. LeRoy and Peter Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court
Review of Punitive Awards in Labor and Employment Arbitrations, 11 Harv Neg L Rev
199, 247 (2006) (noting that in a study of over 1500 court decisions reviewing labor
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the "bad arbitrator" to prove that arbitration harms consumers,
a critical evaluation of arbitration reveals that justice is being
done in the arbitration process. Now that arbitration is a process
that is here to stay, the focus should be on improving the
process, not continuing down the futile path of attempting to
eliminate it as a dispute resolution mechanism.
This Article will focus briefly on the Supreme Court
jurisprudence that led to the current situation in which state
law plays a minimal role in arbitration doctrine. 33 While state
legislatures traditionally regulate contract law issues,34 the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA has resulted in an
anomalous situation in which federal law routinely trumps state
laws that attempt to reform arbitration. 35 The Article will also
explain how the Court's Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen decisions
took the anti-federalism approach a step further-by permitting
preemption in areas the FAA does not address. This expansion
of the preemption doctrine further undermines the states' ability
to substantively regulate arbitration by defining arbitration in a
very specific way and then declaring preempted any laws or
decisions that are not consistent with the definition. Moreover,
this expansion, together with Congress's lack of interest in
regulating arbitration, makes it quite likely that private dispute
resolution providers will be the only entities able to reform the
arbitration process. Recognizing that arbitration law is largely
federalized, this Article will then identify a number of possible
reforms private dispute resolution providers could implement
and review one of the more promising avenues of reform-
arbitrator opinion writing-in greater depth. This reform would
have a number of beneficial effects. It would provide
transparency in the arbitration process, address problems
perceived in the arbitrator selection process, make clear whether
arbitration results, arbitrators are beginning to mirror the role of judges and juries in
their decisions); Weidemaier, 90 NC L Rev at 1093 (cited in note 31) (revealing a study of
arbitrator opinions showing that arbitrators writing reasoned awards act like judges).
33 See generally Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in
Arbitration, 8 Nev L J 326, 332-36 (2007).
3 The Court itself has declared that states are traditionally responsible for
regulating contracts and that federal courts should be "reluctant to federalize" that area
of law. Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 183 (1989), quoting Santa Fe
Industries, Inc v Green, 430 US 462, 479 (1977).
3 As Professors Stephen L. Hayford and Alan R. Palmiter point out, "[tihe Court's
revisionism, effectively creating a national policy favoring arbitration, has shown itself
to have legs." Hayford and Palmiter, 54 Fla L Rev at 178 (cited in note 24).
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the parties received due process during the arbitration, and
ensure that awards are carefully considered and evidence
properly balanced.
I. THE FEDERALIZATION OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Arbitration scholars routinely cite traditional contract law
and federalism principles when critiquing the Supreme Court's
arbitration preemption jurisprudence. 36 The Supreme Court
acknowledges that arbitration agreements, distilled to their
essence, are simply contracts. 37 Following federalism theory,
then, one would expect the Court to respect a state's interest in
regulating in an area traditionally delegated to state
regulation-contract law.38 Nevertheless, the Court, without
36 See generally Brunet, 8 Nev L J 326 (cited in note 22) (tracing the evolution of
state arbitration law and its relation to federalism); Schwartz, State Judges as
Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the FAA's Encroachment on State Law at 47 (cited in
note 1) (urging state court judges to construe the FAA and Supreme Court preemption
precedent narrowly); Drahozal, 79 Ind L J 393 (cited in note 3) (analyzing theories of
FAA preemption and applying those theories to unresolved cases); Margaret Moses, Can
Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U Kan
L Rev 429 (2004) (discussing the scope of judicial review and enforcement of arbitration
agreements as private contracts).
31 In numerous opinions, the Court states that arbitration is a creature of contract
law. See, for example, Hall Street Associates LLC v Mattel Inc, 552 US 576, 585 (2008),
citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc v Byrd, 470 US 213, 220 (1985); Litton Financial
Printing Division, A Division of Litton Business Systems, Inc v NLRB, 501 US 190, 204
(1991); Nolde Brothers, Inc v Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 US 243, 250-
51 (1977) (collecting Supreme Court cases that suggest arbitration is a creature of
contract); United Steelworkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co, 363 US
574, 582 (1960); Gateway Coal Co v Mine Workers of America, 414 US 368, 374 (1974);
John Wiley & Sons, Inc v Livingston, 376 US 543, 547 (1964); Atkinson v Sinclair
Refining Co, 370 US 238, 241 (1962).
3 Initially, the Court appeared likely to permit state regulation of arbitration
agreements. As noted above, Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 as a direct response to
merchants seeking legislative help to overcome judicial hostility to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. Recognizing its limited power under the Commerce Clause,
Congress chose to rely on its power to control federal court jurisdiction; it enacted the
FAA as procedural law, applicable only to federal courts. Thirteen years later, in Erie
Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), the Court held that in diversity cases, a
federal court should apply federal procedural law, but must apply state substantive law
in determining the nature of the parties' rights. See id at 79. As long as courts
considered the FAA to be federal procedural law, then Erie presented no bar to its
enforceability. In a subsequent case, however, Bernhardt v Polygraphic Co of America,
350 US 198 (1956), the Court held that the duty to arbitrate did involve substantive law.
As a result, it held that, with regard to diversity cases, state laws (rather than federal)
regarding arbitration provided the rules of decision, and it thus applied Vermont law to
deny a request for arbitration. See id at 202-05. In the Court's next examination of this
issue, Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co, 388 US 395 (1967), the
Court qualified its holding in Bernhardt by noting that, even in diversity cases, Congress
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referring to federalism in any of its decisions, typically preempts
any state efforts to regulate the enforceability of arbitration
agreements or review of arbitration awards. 39 More recently, the
Court extended that preemption to an area that the FAA does
not specifically address--class action arbitration. 40 Concluding
that class action arbitration is not arbitration (though the FAA
does not define arbitration), the Court held that the FAA
precludes class arbitration and thus trumps state efforts to
condition enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the
existence of a class remedy.41 While the Supreme Court's
holdings that specific provisions of the FAA, which address
enforceability of arbitration agreements as well as review of
arbitration awards, preempt arguably inconsistent state law, it
is perhaps more surprising, and really an abandonment of
federalism principles, to hold that states may not regulate in an
area that the FAA does not address at all.4 2
Previous commentators criticized the Supreme Court
arbitration decisions for ignoring federalism principles. 43 The
can "prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject
matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate." Id at 405. In other words, for
disputes involving interstate commerce (such as the one at issue in Prima Paint), an
area where Congress clearly had the power to regulate, Congress could issue rules
governing federal court procedures for resolving the dispute, including rules mandating
the enforceability of arbitration clauses, regardless of whether such rules were
procedural or substantive. The Court in Prima Paint, though, left open the question of
the extent to which Congress, in enacting the FAA, had imposed or constitutionally could
impose such rules on state courts. The Court finally confronted that issue and
determined that Congress could impose rules on state courts in Southland Corp v
Keating, 465 US 1, 10-12 (1984). Subsequent decisions extended that principle in a
variety of ways.
3 See, for example, Southland Corp v Keating, 465 US 1 (1984) (FAA preempts
California franchise law); Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v Dobson, 513 US 265 (1995)
(FAA preempts Alabama law rendering predispute arbitration agreements
unenforceable); Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681 (1996) (FAA preempts
Montana law requiring arbitration clause to be typed in underlined capital letters on the
first page of the contract).
40 See generally Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740.
4 Id at 1747-51.
42 The FAA provides an incomplete regulatory scheme. While it speaks clearly on
the question of enforceability, it contains relatively little guidance on procedural issues
in arbitration. For example, the FAA provides no direction on the arbitrator's
responsibilities or the arbitrator selection process. See Hayford and Palmiter, 54 Fla L
Rev at 177, 209-10 (cited in note 24) (discussing the FAA's "murky sphere" from which
little direction can be gleaned).
4 See generally David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory
Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 L & Contemp
Probs 5 (2004); Brunet, 8 Nev L J 326 (cited in note 22).
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Court's arbitration preemption decisions, beginning in 1984 with
Southland Corp v Keating44 and continuing through the 2010-11
term in Concepcion, fail to adhere to understood federalism
values such as deference to state law, comity, and dignity.45
Justice O'Connor, in her Southland dissent, explained that the
FAA provided a rule of procedure only applicable in federal
courts. 4 6 O'Connor's interpretation, which arbitration scholars
widely regard as correct, 47 acknowledges federalism concerns, is
consistent with the drafters' goals in writing the FAA, and also
makes sense in light of other FAA provisions, particularly §§ 3
and 4, which clearly apply only in a federal court. 48 Yet, in
44 465 US 1 (1984).
4 See Brunet, 8 Nev L J at 330-32 (cited in note 22) (describing various values of
federalism, including deference to state law, dignity of shared government, and comity-
"respect for the laws of another sovereign power").
46 See Southland Corp, 465 US at 22 (O'Connor dissenting).
47 See, for example, David L. Franklin, "An Edifice of Its Own Creation" The
Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Cases, 10 DePaul Bus & Comm L J 495, 498 (2012)
(noting that Justice Thomas is the only justice who still correctly rules that the FAA
does not apply to the states). For examples of scholars who take issue with the majority
opinion in Southland, see Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation,
Nationalization, Internationalization 121 (Oxford 1992); Paul D. Carrington and Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 S Ct Rev 331, 339, 380 (1996) (noting that
O'Connor demonstrated that the majority opinion in Southland manipulated the history
of the FAA); Schwartz, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 51 (cited in note 43) (arguing that
O'Connor's dissent is "true to the original intent of the FAA"); Edward Brunet, Toward
Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 Brooklyn L Rev 1459, 1469 n 33 (1996);
Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law
Disputes, 1995 U Ill L Rev 635, 677 n 133 (1995); Stephen J. Ware, Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 2.7 at 30 (West Group 2001). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of
Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 Notre
Dame L Rev 101, 103-05 (2002) (noting that, although the majority opinion is
incomplete, "the conclusion it reaches is [not] wrong"). See also Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos, Inc v Dobson, 513 US 265, 285 (1995) (Thomas dissenting) (agreeing with
O'Connor's dissent that the FAA does not apply outside of the federal courts).
48 Justice O'Connor stated,
The majority opinion decides three issues. First, it holds that § 2 creates
federal substantive rights that must be enforced by the state courts. Second,
though the issue is not raised in this case, the Court states . . . that § 2
substantive rights may not be the basis for invoking federal-court jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Third, the Court reads § 2 to require state courts to
enforce § 2 rights using procedures that mimic those specified for federal courts
by FAA §§ 3 and 4. The first of these conclusions is unquestionably wrong as a
matter of statutory construction; the second appears to be an attempt to limit
the damage done by the first; the third is unnecessary and unwise.
Southland, 465 US at 24. As Justice O'Connor emphasized, and most commentators
agree, the majority's contention that the FAA was always intended as substantive law is
inconsistent with the FAA's legislative history and plain text. See id at 24-28. Moreover,
the majority's FAA analysis creates an interpretive problem that Justice O'Connor
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decision after decision following Southland, the Court
repeatedly ignored the interest of state courts and legislatures
in regulating contracts. Although Justice Thomas continues to
dissent in each case where the FAA is applied in state courts
because he believes the FAA is a procedural statute inapplicable
in state courts, 49 Justice O'Connor gave up the argument in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos, Inc v Dobson,50 stating that she
"acquiesce[d] in today's judgment" on stare decisis grounds. 51
In spite of Southland and its progeny, many scholars
believed that matters the FAA did not address, particularly
those that are procedural in nature, would remain open to state
regulation. 52 As Professor Brunet observed following the Green
Tree Financial Corp v Bazzle53 decision, when the Court rejected
the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision permitting an
arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration was permissible
under an arbitration agreement that was silent on the matter, 54
"a high quality argument [could be made] that the states should
be able to regulate arbitration procedures, particularly where
there appears no contrary intent in the text of the FAA."55
mentions but cannot resolve. If the FAA is substantive law, as the majority suggests, it
must be the case that state courts should apply not only § 2 of the FAA, at issue in
Southland, but also §§ 3 and 4. Yet these provisions specify that they apply in federal
courts; section 3 addresses the issue of court stays in "any suit or proceeding ... brought
in any of the courts of the United States." 9 USC § 3. Section 4 allows a party to move to
compel arbitration in "any United States district court." 9 USC § 4. It seems impossible
to reconcile the majority opinion in Southland with the plain language of FAA §§ 3 and
4.
4 See, for example, Green Tree Financial Corp v Bazzle, 539 US 444, 460 (2003)
(Thomas dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated:
I continue to believe that the Federal Arbitration Act ... does not apply to
proceedings in state courts. . . . For that reason, the FAA cannot be a ground
for pre-empting a state court's interpretation of a private arbitration
agreement. Accordingly, I would leave undisturbed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
5o 513 US 265 (1995).
"' Id at 282-84 (O'Connor concurring).
51 See, for example, Drahozal, 79 Ind L J at 417-18 (cited in note 3) (describing a
"preemption continuum" ranging from front-end issues most likely to be preempted to
procedural issues less likely to be preempted); Brunet, 8 Nev L J at 333 (cited in note 22)
(noting the state procedural rules could survive the "obstacle test"); Hayford and
Palmiter, 54 Fla L Rev at 226 (cited in note 24) (suggesting that states fill in the gaps in
the FAA where Congress has failed to act).
5 539 US 444 (2003).
5 See id at 454 (vacating the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision).
5 Brunet, 8 Nev L J at 338 (cited in note 22).
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In 2000, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA)
drafters concluded that FAA preemption would be unlikely to
impact state law provisions regarding discovery, consolidation of
claims, and arbitrator immunity, all second generation issues
the FAA did not address.56 The drafters were less sanguine
about the possibility of avoiding regulation on substantive issues
such as the arbitrators' authority to award punitive damages or
the standards governing arbitrator disclosure of conflicts of
interest.57 According to the drafters, the FAA did not address
any of these issues because it focuses primarily on front-end
(enforceability) and back-end (judicial review of arbitral awards)
issues.58 But regulation of these issues might nevertheless be
preempted, the drafters reasoned, because, unlike discovery and
immunity, punitive damages and conflicts questions are not
entirely procedural in nature. Ultimately, the drafters concluded
that, "[a]lthough there is no concrete guidance in the case law,
preemption of state law dealing with such matters seems
unlikely as long as it cannot be characterized as anti-arbitration
or as intended to limit the enforceability or viability of
agreements to arbitrate."59
Professor Stephen Hayford, writing in 2002, described the
areas the FAA did not address as a "murky sphere" extending
beyond the FAA's core "but without the same clarity and force as
in the legislation's provisions on enforceability and
arbitrability."60 When evaluating state arbitration rules,
Hayford stated that a court should determine whether the "rule
is consistent with the twin purposes of the FAA: namely, to
overcome hostility to arbitration and to effectuate the parties'
arbitration agreement."61 In other words, when considering rules
56 Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 2000), Prefatory Note, in Stephen B. Goldberg, et al, Dispute
Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration, and Other Processes Appendix D at 603
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 6th ed 2012). Hayford and Palmiter agree with this
position: "Nowhere does the FAA mention pre-hearing discovery, summary disposition,
consolidation of claims, or provisional remedies." Hayford and Palmiter, 54 Fla L Rev at
178 (cited in note 24).
* Goldberg, et al, Dispute Resolution at 603 (cited in note 56).
- Id at 600-01.
5 Id at 603.
6 Hayford and Palmiter, 54 Fla L Rev at 177 (cited in note 24).
61 Id at 201. Professor Jean Sternlight agrees: "[wihile the FAA does not occupy the
entire field of arbitration, it does preempt those state laws that would undermine the
goals of the FAA." Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as
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addressing areas that the FAA does not mention, the question
should be only whether the rule furthers the FAA's pro-
arbitration policy. So long as it does, the FAA should not
preempt it.62
Professor Chris Drahozal outlined the possible preemption
approaches the Court might adopt to address what he described
as the "second generation" arbitration cases-those cases where
the state's regulation or judicial decision addressed areas that
the FAA does not specifically address. 63 According to Professor
Drahozal, the Court could choose from one of the following four
methods to determine whether preemption should apply: [1]
Keystone theory, stating that "[a] state law is not preempted ...
so long as the law does not invalidate the parties' arbitration
agreement";64 [2] RUAA theory (the RUAA drafters' view of
preemption), stating that a state law may be preempted if it
invalidates the parties' agreement or "if the state law conflicts
with terms in the arbitration agreement addressing 'the most
essential dimensions of the commercial arbitration process,"'
terms that go to the arbitration agreement's essence;65 [3] anti-
FAA theory, stating that preemption is appropriate if the state
law is anti-FAA in that it conflicts with or limits "explicit FAA
provisions or general federal arbitration law";66 or [4] pro-
contract theory, stating that state laws that do not invalidate
the parties' arbitration agreement but conflict with one of the
agreement's provisions should be preempted. 67 If the Court
a Substitute for the Jury Trial, in The Privatization of Justice? Mandatory Arbitration
and the State Courts, Report of the 2003 Forum for State Appellate Court Judges 5, 14
(Pound Civil Justice Institute 2003).
62 Following this logic, though, Hayford sounded a note of caution, concluding that
mandatory state arbitration rules might be problematic under the Supreme Court's
approach to arbitration federalism because such rules suggest that the parties'
agreement to the contrary would not be enforceable. See Hayford and Palmiter, 54 Fla L
Rev at 201 (cited in note 24). If the rule can provide content to the parties' promise, it
would pass muster; if it mandated a certain path, by contrast, it would not. See id at 204.
Under this conception, a rule mandating a certain amount of discovery or a reasoned
award would be unlikely to avoid preemption, at least if it did not permit the parties to
contract around the rule. But if the parties could contract around the rule, in consumer
arbitration at least, it is unlikely that a requirement of reasoned written opinions would
appear since the business drafting the arbitration agreement would be unlikely to
include such a provision.
6 Drahozal, 79 Ind L J at 395 (cited in note 3).
64 Id at 417.
6 Id (such as enforceability and judicial review of arbitration awards).
6 Id at 418 (citation omitted).
67 Drahozal, 79 Ind L J at 419 (cited in note 3).
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adopted the Keystone, anti-FAA, or pro-contract theories,
preemption of second generation arbitration issues would be
unlikely because none of the state regulations or decisional law
addressing these issues invalidates the arbitration agreement or
contradicts general arbitration law, nor do the parties typically
include these issues in their agreements. The result would be
less clear if the Court adopted the RUAA theory because
divining the essential dimensions of the arbitration process can
lead to unpredictable results. After all, what are the essential
dimensions of the arbitration process?
Some guidance regarding these issues seemed possible
when the Court decided Hall Street Associates v Mattel,68 a case
that considered whether parties could agree to expand judicial
review of an arbitration award in ways the FAA did not
identify.69 Although the FAA addresses judicial review of
arbitration awards, all the federal circuit courts had permitted
lower courts to review arbitration awards on the basis of
manifest disregard of the law, a standard that does not appear
in the Federal Arbitration Act.70 The Hall Street Court followed
the traditional arbitration preemption approach, holding that
because the FAA specifically identifies the bases upon which
individuals may challenge arbitration awards, parties do not
have the ability to expand the bases upon which a court may
rely when reviewing an award.71 Hall Street did not provide
much guidance on the question of whether state legislatures
could regulate in areas that the FAA does not address because
Hall Street considered a factual scenario that the FAA does
address: judicial review of arbitration awards.
Ultimately, though, it appears that the Court adopted a
version of the RUAA theory and, in addition, declared the
essential terms of the arbitration process. The Concepcion Court
applied a version of the RUAA theory when it considered
whether the FAA preempted a judicial decision conditioning
6 552 US 576 (2008).
6 See id at 586.
70 See id at 583 & n 5 (noting that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits expressly held that
parties could not contract for increased judicial review with the Eighth Circuit agreeing
in dicta and that the First, Third, Fifth, and Six Circuits have held the opposite with the
Fourth Circuit agreeing in an unpublished opinion). See also id at 584-85 (listing cases
that recognize "manifest disregard for the law" as a reason for judicial vacatur of an
arbitration award).
n Id at 584, 586-87.
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enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of
class action arbitration (an issue the FAA does not address). 72
The Court held that courts cannot condition enforceability of an
arbitration agreement on the availability of class action
arbitration.73 In the decision, the Court identified a platonic
arbitration ideal likely to hinder future state efforts to regulate
areas the FAA does not address:
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties,
necessitating additional and different procedures and
involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more
difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an
arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-
certification question, arbitrators are not generally
knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects
of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.
The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the
extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA. 74
This decision followed closely on the heels of the Court's
Stolt-Nielsen decision in which the Court explained that class
action and bilateral (traditional) arbitration are wholly different:
"[i]n bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and
appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of
private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes."75
Interpreting these two decisions, the Court seems to be
homing in on an essential nature of arbitration that state courts
and legislatures alter at their peril. That essential nature
includes confidentiality of the proceedings, all parties present,
knowledgeable arbitrators, lower costs, speed, efficiency, limited
72 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744.
1 Id at 1750-51.
74 Id, citing Discover Bank v Superior Court, 113 P3d 1110 (Cal 2005).
' Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S Ct at 1775. Professor S.I. Strong observed with surprise the
Court's reaction to class arbitration because it has existed for over 30 years and has been
the subject of Supreme Court review. See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration "Change the
Nature" of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 Harv
Neg L Rev 201, 214-15, 263-64 (2012). For Professor Strong's views on procedural rigor
and class arbitration, see id at 228.
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judicial review, and limited "procedural rigor."76 In addition, the
Court identified the "different procedures" and "higher stakes" of
class arbitration as distinguishing it from bilateral arbitration.77
While the Court provided some guidance regarding the different
procedures of and higher stakes involved in class arbitration, it
failed to articulate a standard for judging how many attributes
of traditional arbitration can change before those changes would
be considered problematic and therefore preempted.
Nevertheless, the Court's description of arbitration as a process
with limited procedural rigor, which is also inexpensive, speedy,
and lacks review, suggests that most attempted state reforms of
the arbitration process (likely even increased discovery) would
be preempted.78
By defining arbitration, the Court may be sending a signal
that FAA preemption, even in areas that the FAA does not
address, is likely to occur.79 Rather than limit rejection of state
legislative and decisional arbitration law to areas presenting
potential inconsistency with the FAA, Concepion and Stolt-
Nielson reject states' ability to regulate in areas the FAA does
not address.
7 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1751, citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S Ct at 1776.
n Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1750-51. But see Strong, 17 Harv Neg L Rev at 262-66
(cited in note 75) ("[C]oncerns about arbitrator competence ... appear insufficient to call
the legitimacy of class arbitration into question.").
78 Not surprisingly, the dissent in Concepcion takes a different position. According
to the dissent, class arbitration is not inconsistent with the FAA's purpose unless it
discouraged the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at
1757-58 (Breyer dissenting). Treating the primary goal of the FAA as clause
enforcement rather than as a means for ensuring that a certain kind of arbitration takes
place enabled the dissent to enforce California's rule requiring class arbitration
availability. See id at 1758. The primary objective of the FAA, according to the dissent,
was not to guarantee certain procedural rules-it was to "secure the 'enforcement' of
agreements to arbitrate." See id. The dissent emphasized the Court's early approach to
arbitration as a dynamic process to show the inconsistency with its new, rigid conception
of arbitration in the majority opinion. See id at 1761.
79 This approach seems inconsistent with traditional preemption jurisprudence that
would permit state regulation unless the regulation "stands as an obstacle" to carrying
out the FAA's purpose. See Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism:
Resisting the FAA's Encroachment on State Law at 61 (cited in note 1), quoting Geier v
American Honda Motor Co, 52 US 861, 873 (2000). Professor Schwartz suggested an
example of the type of state regulation that would not traditionally be preempted-
California's ethics rules governing arbitrators and dispute resolution services providers.
See Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the FAA's
Encroachment on State Law at 61 (cited in note 1). While the case law on California's
rules has yet to develop, regulating arbitrators, like ensuring arbitration meets certain
criteria, might be preempted by the current Supreme Court.
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Despite repeated critiques of the Supreme Court's
arbitration jurisprudence,8 0 the Supreme Court unquestionably
endorses the use of arbitration and does not tolerate state
regulation of arbitration that it perceives to be inconsistent with
or hostile to the FAA's express language or the Court's
interpretation of what arbitration is.81 While Congress could
enact legislation to counteract the Supreme Court decisions, at
least in those subject areas the FAA does not address, such
regulation is simply not forthcoming. In light of the dearth of
regulation, a more practical answer may be to look to the private
sector dispute resolution services providers to see if some
attempt to improve due process in arbitration might accomplish
some of the goals that state legislatures have been forced to
abandon.
Federalism principles suggest that state experimentation
with possible solutions to existing problems is preferable to a
single decision maker, such as the federal government, dictating
a particular approach.82 In the consumer arbitration area, where
empirical work to determine arbitration's utility is in its infancy,
this type of experimentation could be especially beneficial. Yet,
time after time, the Supreme Court has stricken state efforts to
regulate arbitration. Some critics of the Court's anti-federalism
approach hoped that, at least in areas that the FAA did not
specifically address, such as class action arbitration, the Court
would permit states to regulate. Those hopes were dashed,
however, when the Court made clear that class arbitration is not
arbitration and that conditioning enforceability of an arbitration
agreement on the existence of a class process was preempted.83
The Court's decisions striking down the states' efforts to
regulate do not preclude private dispute resolution organizations
from experimenting with the services they provide to consumers
so See generally Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After
Concepcion?, 60 Kan L Rev 767 (2012).
81 Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1749, citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury
Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24 (describing § 2 of the FAA as enacting a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary").
82 See, for example, New State Ice Co v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
8 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753.
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and businesses. 84 Possible areas for regulation include
improving the arbitrator selection processes to ensure the
selection of impartial and independent arbitrators, mandating
arbitrator opinion writing, transcript maintenance, increased
discovery, access to representation, access to full statutory
remedies, and development of mechanisms for ensuring that the
process is not costly or inconvenient to the consumer.85
At the risk of discouraging the kind of experimentation that
might be particularly beneficial in consumer arbitration, the
remainder of the Article will explore in depth one possible
reform to the arbitration process: requiring arbitrators to issue
reasoned, written awards. More research and analysis of other
possible reforms would also be helpful but must be left for
another Article.
II. ARBITRATION OPINION WRITING
State legislatures or arbitral provider organizations, such as
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), should reconsider
their approach to arbitrator opinion writing. Recent articles by
Professors Mark Weidemaier and Arianna Levinson indicate
that the arbitration process, contrary to what seems to be
popular belief, provides access to justice for one-shot players
with statutory claims.86 Moreover, arbitrators engage in a
8 Some might describe this approach as the fox guarding the hen house. See David
S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind L J 239, 247 (2012)
(noting that AAA and other dispute resolution providers have no incentive to make pre-
dispute arbitration agreements attractive to consumers because consumers do not
purchase the service-buyers of neutral provider organization's services are all entities
desiring to suppress claims).
8 See Fincher, et al, An Examination of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 at *80-
82 (cited in note 25) (finding the AFA's remedy of eliminating all pre-dispute arbitration
agreements unnecessary and noting that there have been efforts to improve the fairness
and transparency of the arbitration process). See also Schmitz, 28 Bank & Fin Serv Pol
Rep at 23-29 (cited in note 25).
6 See Weidemaier, 90 NC L Rev at 1093 (cited in note 31) (concluding that
arbitrators behave much like judges); Levinson, 46 U Mich J L Reform at *48 (cited in
note 31). After examining 160 labor arbitration opinions in employment discrimination
cases, Levinson concludes that labor arbitration provides access to justice in "many
instances" and "often provides a procedure with due process protections, a decision-
maker who interprets the law and the contract as applied to the facts, and a union which
advocates for the grievant's rights." Id. See also Christopher R. Drahozal and Samantha
Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 Ohio St J on Disp Resol
843, 845-46 (2010) (noting that in a study of over 300 AAA arbitrations in the consumer
setting, no statistically significant "repeat player" advantage was detected); Amy J.
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decision-making and opinion-writing process (when they write
opinions) that is quite similar to the process in which judges
engage. Weidemaier's and Levinson's studies confirm long-held
beliefs in the arbitral community (although less so outside that
community) that arbitrators are capable of understanding and
applying precedent and can interpret legal rulings in a manner
similar to judges. If these studies and beliefs are accurate,
greater transparency in all types of arbitration through the
implementation of mandatory arbitrator opinion writing, could
substantially improve the process itself as well as the public's
and parties' perceptions of the process.
Accepting Weidemaier's and Levinson's studies as accurate,
this Article does not suggest that businesses abandon
arbitration or even dramatically transform the arbitration
process. Instead, it advocates one significant change, which will
cost some, but not a great deal of, money and resources. The
writing of an arbitration opinion will address most arbitration
opponents' concerns about using this process to resolve
consumer disputes.87 In addition to improving the quality of
arbitral decision making, opinion writing will bring greater
transparency to the arbitrator selection process, enabling even
the one-shot player to make better-educated selection decisions;
improve the hearing process (because the arbitrator will need to
make sure he or she understands all of the issues presented);
and provide a greater sense of resolution to the parties, who will
now have a deeper understanding of the reasons they won or
Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 Ohio St J
on Disp Resol 627, 629-30 (2008), citing Kirk D. Jensen, Summaries of Empirical
Studies and Surveys of How Individuals Fare in Arbitration, 60 Consumer Fin L Q Rep
631, 631-25 (2006) (statistical evidence may suggest arbitration provides higher recovery
rates for consumers than using the courts). But see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 1247, 1340 (2009) ("[Whatever else
mandatory arbitration may be, there is no evidence that it is fair."); Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial, 16 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 669, 669-71 (2001) (arguing that mandatory
binding arbitration is in conflict with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial).
8 Consumer advocates would prefer a world in which consumer agreements were
not covered by the FAA, that is, where consumers were not bound by arbitration
agreements. At this point, however, case law states that consumer arbitration
agreements are enforceable if they are not unconscionable and that, in most cases,
individual consumers may not proceed as a class action in arbitration or court. Moreover,
proposed legislation designed to exempt consumers from FAA coverage has failed
repeatedly. Taking as true a world in which consumers are bound by arbitration
agreements, this Article focuses on improvements to the arbitration process rather than
continuing to press for its abandonment as a dispute resolution process.
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lost. Moreover, this relatively inexpensive process change would
have a significant impact on parties' and the public's perception
of arbitration as a fair and legitimate forum for the resolution of
disputes and would also likely improve the quality of arbitral
decision making.
As articulated more fully below, private groups could add
these requirements without creating or incurring significant
additional costs. In some respects, it may be surprising that this
requirement does not already exist. The history and
development of commercial and labor arbitration, which this
article will now examine, may help explain the absence of this
requirement.
A. History of Opinion Writing in Arbitration
Arbitration has been an alternative to litigation for
hundreds of years. During the early medieval period, merchants
in France, England, and Germany conducted the majority of
their business at trade fairs.88 Disputes between buyers and
sellers at these temporary fairs had to be resolved quickly and
finally so that the parties could depart for home. In addition,
standards for resolution were necessary so that all disputants
would accept the outcome. As a result, trades and industry
began maintaining arbitration tribunals with elected arbitrators
to resolve these disputes. 89 Arbitration or merchant judges were
to decide cases by applying custom and usage norms of the
parties rather than the law of the land. This procedural law,
known as "the law merchant," developed independently of the
common law.90 By the early seventeenth century, arbitration
was the preferred mechanism for resolving disputes under the
law merchant.9 1
Merchants brought the arbitration process to the pre-
Revolution American colonies. 92 Merchants served as arbitrators
8 See Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law 7-
21 (Rothman 1980). Trading often went on for several weeks. It is not surprising,
therefore, that disputes would arise as well as the need for a means to adjudicate these
disputes.
8 Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration § 2:4 (Gabriel Wilner ed 1990).
g See id.
91 See id.
92 See Ian R. MacNeil, Richard E. Speidel, and Thomas J. Stipanowich, Federal
Arbitration Law, Agreements, Awards, and Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act
§ 4.3.1 (Little, Brown and Company 1994) (noting that, while colonial America practiced
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and chambers of commerce developed in part to ensure the
institutionalization of the arbitration process. 93 As communities
grew larger and reputation within a particular industry became
less important, however, merchants turned to state legislatures
and to Congress to protect enforcement of their arbitration
agreements and awards. 94 Once Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act-which ensured enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards-in 1925, the use of commercial
arbitration increased dramatically. A short time later, in the
1940s, labor arbitration became popular and remains popular
today. Modern collective bargaining agreements virtually always
contain a provision for final and binding arbitration.
Yet, commercial and labor arbitration differ in a
fundamental way.95 While written opinions are common in labor
arbitration, it is rare for a commercial arbitrator to draft a
written opinion. While labor arbitrators typically make
extensive findings of fact, articulate the parties' positions, and
offer reasoning based on custom or law, commercial arbitrators
are not required to explain their reasoning and rarely do. 9 6 In
arbitration, it did not have the support of similar statutes and jurisdiction as English
arbitration); Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 NYU L Rev 443, 469-71 (1984) (describing colonial merchant
arbitration).
9 See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum L Rev 846, 855 (1961).
9 Professor Amy J. Cohen explained that merchants preferred informal procedures
because they could bring "a range of social experience and social expertise to bear on
legal disputes." Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J of Disp Resol
91, 104 (2011). Merchants preferred arbitration because it permitted them to "adjust
their own economic relations in the marketplace." Id at 105. The FAA was necessary,
though, in order to ensure that agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards would be
honored. Id at 104.
9 Labor arbitration developed as a means to ensure "extended negotiation between
highly interdependent parties." G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment
Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68
Tex L Rev 509, 512 (1990). Under this model, the arbitrator is the parties' agent for
contract interpretation and is supposed to issue an award that is a close approximation
of what the parties themselves would have negotiated. Id. Application of this model
protects and may strengthen the parties' underlying relationship. By contrast,
commercial arbitrators should act like judges and should provide resolution cheaply and
efficiently. Id. This may be particularly surprising because parties often want
commercial arbitrators to interpret external law, not just apply customs. See id at 532.
Unlike labor arbitration, arbitrators are not limited in their capacity to render awards
even when the subject matter is a federal statute. In other words, they may impose
liability and award damages generally without restriction. See id at 533.
9 However, Edward Brunet noted, "Arbitrators are often said to be experts in the
subject matter of the disputes they adjudicate. Certainly this was true of the historic
commercial arbitrations between textile merchants." Edward Brunet, Arbitration and
Constitutional Rights, 71 NC L Rev 81, 88 (1992).
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addition, while parties often agree to publish labor arbitrators'
awards, it is rare that parties agree to publish a commercial
arbitrator's award.97
History may be the best resource to explain why labor
arbitrators write opinions and commercial arbitrators do not.
During World War II, the War Labor Board introduced
arbitration as a nonviolent mechanism to resolve disputes
between businesses and their workers so that the war effort
would not be disrupted.98 The War Labor Board championed the
use of arbitration as a peaceful method for resolving grievances
and compelled the inclusion of arbitration agreements in
collective bargaining agreements.99 The success of War Labor
Board arbitration created the impetus for greater use of
arbitration. Although the War Labor Board success in part
explains the use of arbitration among unions and employers,
these entities embraced grievance arbitration for other reasons
as well.100 Unions preferred arbitration because courts were
9 See Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public
Law Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 Emp Rts
& Emp Policy J 285, 299 (2000); Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial
Standards for Vacatur, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 443, 444-45 (1998) (noting that commercial
arbitrators rarely explain their reasoning).
9 See Robert V. Massey Jr, History of Arbitration and Grievance Arbitration in the
United States *3 (Institute for Labor Studies and Research), online at http://www.
laborstudiesandresearch.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003 (visited Sept 15, 2013). Massey
notes that
[blecause of the great World War, President Franklin Roosevelt and his War
Labor Board were cognizant of the fact that during this war the interruption of
steel production and other war materials could not be tolerated by work
stoppages taking place prior to interest arbitration hearings. Therefore,
Roosevelt's War Labor Board insisted that labor and management place
grievance-arbitration clauses into collective bargaining agreements as a final
and binding last step of the grievance procedure to meet the wartime
production needs of the country.
Id. See generally Benjamin Aaron, Catalyst: The National War Labor Board of World
War II, 39 Case W Res L Rev 519 (1989).
9 See, for example, In re Walker Turner Co, Inc, 1 War Labor Reps 101, 107 (1942)
(holding that in a dispute between a union and a company which have never had a
mutually acceptable procedure for the settlement of grievances, the collective bargaining
agreement should provide that grievances be submitted to a committee); In re Champlin
Refining Co, 3 War Labor Reps 155, 155 (1942) (ordering an arbitration clause written
into the collective bargaining agreement). See generally Jack G. Day, Symposium: An
Oral History of the National War Labor Board and Critical Issues in the Development of
Modern Grievance Arbitration: Prologue, 39 Case W Res L Rev 515 (1988-1989).
'n Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights 'Waived" and Lost in
the Arbitration Forum, 13 Hofstra Labor L J 381, 398-99 (1996), citing Calvert
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frequently hostile toward unions' efforts to organize and
participate in workplace governance. 101 Employers, perhaps
more reluctantly than the unions, accepted arbitration because
the provision was offered in exchange for a no-strike clause. 102 In
addition, the limited scope of labor arbitrator awards helped to
institutionalize arbitration as the method for dispute resolution
in private sector labor relations. Parties' agreements to award
only reinstatement, restoration of seniority, and back pay to a
winning grievant limited the arbitrator's authority. Well-known
labor arbitrator and Professor Reginald Alleyne explained that a
grievant could typically obtain only back pay, with interim
earnings deducted and no punitive damages.103 Thus, the risks
of an unfair result were limited for both sides and, consequently,
both sides embraced the process.
Although the tradition of labor arbitrators writing opinions
may seem at odds with the efficiency rationale underlying
grievance arbitration, over time parties have come to expect the
written opinions and, when given the opportunity in the late
1960s to avoid opinion writing and its attendant costs, failed to
do so. Not only do labor arbitrators routinely write awards, but
they also treat arbitration opinions and awards as a form of non-
binding precedent. 104 It is common for advocates to cite
arbitrators' opinions in their post-hearing briefs and to rely on
treatises whose main purpose is to identify trends and customs
in labor arbitration. 05 Arbitrators in the labor field look to these
treatises and opinions to help them analyze particular cases and
to justify decisions that they reach.
Commercial arbitration, by contrast, never embraced the
written arbitration award. The lack of opinion writing may stem
from commercial arbitration's earlier origin in the pie powder
fairs of the twelfth century. When New York merchants lobbied
for the passage of a federal arbitration act, they focused on
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards, not on
requiring arbitrators to offer reasons to support their
McGruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective
Bargaining, 50 Harv L Rev 1071, 1112-13 (1937).
101 Id.
10 See id; Aaron, 39 Case W Res L Rev at 521-22 (cited in note 98).
103 Alleyne, 13 Hofstra Labor L J at 399 (cited in note 100).
'0 Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 365-88 (BNA 3d
ed 1973).
105 See id at 369.
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conclusions. As had been the case for centuries, nothing in the
1925 Federal Arbitration Act required an arbitrator to make
findings of fact or draw conclusions of law. 106 The Supreme
Court confirmed that arbitrators need not write opinions in
Bernhardt v Polygraphic Co of America, Inc,107 when it stated
that "[a]rbitrators . . . need not give reasons for their results." 08
Numerous courts have followed this principle in subsequent
decisions. The Uniform Arbitration Act, modeled after the FAA,
does not require written opinions either. 109
B. Approaches to the Arbitrator Opinion
Other industries, perhaps acknowledging the success of
arbitration in resolving commercial and labor disputes, adopted
arbitration as a primary dispute resolution mechanism but
followed commercial arbitration's practice of not writing
reasoned opinions. The securities industry, for example, wholly
embraced the process, adopting mandatory arbitration for all
disputes arising in the industry, including customer disputes
against brokers. Because the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) closely regulates the arbitration process and
because it is the only process used to resolve disputes in the
securities industry, procedures governing securities arbitration
have evolved more quickly and in a more calculated way than
labor and commercial arbitration procedures. At the outset,
arbitration awards had to be in writing and include "a summary
of the issues . . . a description of the award . .. [and] decisions
made available to the public."110 This requirement did not,
however, result in "reasoned" written opinions. Few securities
arbitration awards contained anything other than a statement
1os See Raytheon Co v Automated Business Systems, Inc, 882 F2d 6, 8 (1st Cir 1989).
107 350 US 198 (1956).
'as Id at 203. See, for example, Rai v Ernst & Young, LLP, 2010 WL 3518056 (ED
Mich 2010) (arbitrators do not have an obligation to write an opinion); United
Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 US 593, 598 (1960)
(arbitrators have no obligation to explain their reasons or write an opinion); Butler
Manufacturing Co v USW, 336 F3d 629, 636 (7th Cir 2003) (citing Enterprise Wheel, the
court stated that arbitrators are normally not required to write an opinion).
'09 See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L Rev 949, 1082-83 (2000)
(indicating that the FAA and UAA are anomalies in the arbitration field because neither
Act requires a reasoned written opinion).
110 Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20, 31-32 (1991).
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of the issues and an indication of whether or not relief was
granted.111
A primary critique of securities arbitration has been that
the arbitrators do not provide written opinions with facts or
reasoning to support their awards. 112 In response to this
critique, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
initially proposed an amendment to its rules that would require
arbitrators to provide written awards at the request of
consumers' counsel. 113 Ultimately, however, FINRA adopted a
n' For examples of this trend, see generally, Podber v Interstate Johnson
Lane/Wachovia, Inc, 2003 WL 271323 (NASD); Bell v Morgan Stanley, 2002 WL 535953
(NASD); Walborn v Aetna Life Insurance and Annuity Co, 2001 WL 1004226 (NASD).
Professor Jennifer J. Johnson reviewed NASD opinions from 2003-2004 resolving
customer-broker disputes. She found that in 2003, fewer than 5 percent of the 2,077
customer cases closed through arbitration offered even a brief explanation of the panel's
decision. In 2004, her review of arbitration awards revealed that fewer than 5 percent of
the 2,423 NASD customer cases closed through the arbitration process included an
opinion that explained the award. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild
West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 NC L Rev 123, 144-45
(2005).
112 Professor Peter B. Rutledge proposes a different solution to the problem. Rather
than creating a written opinion requirement, Rutledge proposes stripping arbitrators of
their immunity. Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining
Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 Pace L Rev
113, 121-24 (2005). Without immunity, Rutledge reasons that arbitrators will have a
greater incentive to write awards. Id at 125-26. Although this approach may encourage
greater opinion writing, particularly for the risk-averse arbitrator, a more direct method
for accomplishing this goal, which is less likely to increase litigation and its attendant
costs, would be to require either a transcript of the arbitral hearing or a reasoned
written opinion. See also Seth E. Lipner, Explained Awards (Arbitration Securities and
Investment Fraud Lawyers 2013), online at http: //www.securitiesarbitrations.com/Finra-
Securities-Arbitration/Arbitration-Awards/Explained-Awards (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(explaining that FINRA adopted the current rule requiring agreement of parties before
mandating an explained award rather than the amendment that would have granted
investors the unilateral ability to request an explained award because of the brokerage
firms' vehement protests). Professors Barbara Black and Jill Gross performed a study to
evaluate whether customers find securities arbitration fair. See Barbara Black and Jill
Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study *1
(University of Cincinnati College of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper
Series No 08-01 Feb 2008), online at http: /papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1090969 (visited Sept 15, 2013). This empirical study revealed that "overall,
participants were not satisfied with the outcome of their most recent dispute and would
be more satisfied if they had an explanation of the award." Id at *3.
113 The NASD's initial proposal would have permitted either customers or associated
persons to request an explained decision. NASD, SR-NASD-2005-032 Proposed Rule
Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, to Provide Written Explanations in
Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of Customers, or of Associated Persons in
Industry Controversies, 70 Fed Reg 41065 (2005) (amending NASD, Rule § 10330()(2)).
An explained decision is a "fact-based award stating the reason(s) each alleged cause of
action was granted or denied. Inclusion of legal authorities and damage calculations is
not required." 70 Fed Reg at 41065. The rule filing was later withdrawn and replaced
with a rule requiring an explanation of the decision only "upon the joint request of the
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rule less likely to result in reasoned opinions. Rather than
permit the consumer to request a written opinion, FINRA
changed the amendment to permit "explained decisions" only if
both sides request it.114 Since it is unlikely that the repeat
player in the arbitration will request the reasoned opinion, the
new rule, while an improvement, is unlikely to result in better-
reasoned opinions.
Interestingly, while commercial arbitration and securities
arbitration awards remain relatively reason-free, some of the
arbitrator provider organizations responded to arbitration
critiques by creating a reasoned opinion requirement, at least in
the context of consumer arbitration. National Arbitration Forum
(NAF), an arbitrator provider organization,115 permits a
consumer, on her own initiative, to request a written decision. 116
While the default rule results in a summary award, if the
consumer files a written request "seeking reasons, findings of
fact or conclusions of law" within ten days of the Notice of
parties." FINRA, SR-FINRA-2008-051 Proposed Rule Change to Amend Rules 12214,
12514 and 12904 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and Rules
13214, 13514 and 13904 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to
Require Arbitrators to Provide an Explained Decision upon the Joint Request of the
Parties, 73 Fed Reg 64995, 64996 (2008).
114 73 Fed Reg at 64995 (cited in note 113).
115 NAF is not currently accepting consumer arbitrations and has not accepted
consumer arbitrations since July 19, 2009. The rules discussed in this section were
applied to consumer arbitrations filed in 2008 and 2009. In 2009, the Minnesota
Attorney General sued NAF for consumer fraud. See In re National Arbitration Forum
Trade Litigation, 704 F Supp 2d 832, 835 (D Minn 2010) (delivering the court's
perspective on and summarizing the NAF's credit arbitration cessation). Although a
hedge fund with financial interests in debt collection businesses owned NAF, NAF
nevertheless continued to administer consumer debt collection arbitrations. See id. To
settle Minnesota's claim against NAF, NAF agreed to stop administering consumer and
credit card arbitrations in Minnesota. See id; Carrick Mollenkamp, Dionne Searcey, and
Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in Arbitration Empire Upends Credit-Card Disputes, Wall
Street Journal Al (Oct 15, 2009) (describing the debt collection agency Accretive's
connection to the NAF fraud and the shift away from consumer debt collection
arbitration).
116 Either party may request the written opinion. Thus, unlike FINRA arbitration,
which requires both parties to agree to the written opinion, in consumer arbitration, it is
more likely that an arbitrator will issue an opinion. See National Arbitration Forum,
Code of Procedure Rule 37.H (2008), online at http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/
resources/CodeofProcedure2008-print2.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules, like FINRA, only require an arbitrator to write an opinion if both
parties request it. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules &
Mediation Procedures R-42 (2009), online at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?
nodeld=IUCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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Selection of an Arbitrator, she will be entitled to a written
opinion.1 1 7
AAA's Consumer Supplementary Rules do not go as far as
NAF's but still require the arbitrator to "apply any identified
pertinent contract terms, statutes, and legal precedents." 18
Moreover, the arbitrator is permitted to issue any remedy that
the parties could have obtained in court. 119 JAMS's Consumer
Arbitration Rules are somewhat less clear. While the rules seem
to require some type of written award, the rule's language does
not describe how in-depth an arbitrator must go in analyzing
facts, customs, and laws. The rule states, "An [a]rbitrator's
[a]ward will consist of a written statement stating the
disposition of each claim. The award will also provide a concise
written statement of the essential findings and conclusions on
which the award is based." 2 0
AAA's rules for employment disputes, which were drafted in
response to the development of a Due Process Protocol for
Resolution of Employment Disputes through Arbitration and
Mediation, also require that the arbitrator provide written
reasons supporting his or her award.121 Rule 39 provides that
"[t]he award shall be in writing ... and shall provide the written
reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise." 122
Class arbitration is also a more recent phenomenon. In
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle, a decision in
which a plurality of the Supreme Court appeared to confer
authority on arbitrators to order class arbitration from an
arbitration agreement silent on the issue,123 both AAA and
JAMS quickly developed rules to govern class arbitration. These
n1 See National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure at Rule 37.H (cited in note
116). The fee for the written opinion is quite reasonable.
n1 American Arbitration Association, Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary




120 JAMS, JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-dispute Clauses
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness *3 (July 2009), online at http:Iwww.
jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSConsumer Min Stds-
2009.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
121 American Arbitration Association, Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures Rule 39.c, (June 2010), online at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?
nodeld=/UCMIADRSTG 004362&revision=latestreleased (visited Sept 15, 2013).
122 Id.
123 See Bazzle, 539 US at 444.
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rules, modeled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, required, among other things,124 that the arbitrators
write reasoned opinions and that those opinions be accessible on
the providers' websites. AAA's rule, for example, states that
"[t]he final award on the merits in a class arbitration, whether
or not favorable to the class, shall be reasoned . . . ."125 A review
of AAA's class arbitration awards reveals that the class
arbitrators comply with this rule.126 While the future of class
arbitration following Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion is very much
in doubt, 127 a trend toward reasoned opinions in arbitration
124 See FRCP 23. Other requirements from the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitration include: (1) At least one arbitrator shall be appointed from AAA's national
roster of class arbitration arbitrators; (2) If the parties cannot agree on the number of
arbitrators, one arbitrator shall hear the case unless the AAA exercises its discretionary
power to provide three arbitrators; (3) The arbitrator must resolve, as a threshold
matter, whether the case may proceed on behalf or against a class; (4) A list of conditions
that allow a class action; (5) A reasoned determination of whether a class action is
allowable; (6) An effort to provide reasonable notice to all affected parties of the class
determination; (7) A final award on the merits of the class arbitration; (8) A list of
procedures in the event of settlement; (9) A presumption of confidentiality; (10) A
reasoned opinion on the award, available publically for a cost; (11) A list of provisions
regarding administrative fees and penalties for nonpayment; (12) A list of stipulations
providing that judicial proceedings do not constitute a waiver of arbitration. See
American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations Rules 1-
12 (Oct 2003), online at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF.?url=/cs/groups/commerciall
documents/document/mdaw/mdax/-edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
125 American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations,
Rule 7 (cited in note 124). JAMS final class arbitration award rule states that
[tihe final award on the merits in a class arbitration, whether or not favorable
to the class, shall be reasoned and shall define the class with specificity, and
shall set forth the reasons the class was or was not certified and the legal and
factual findings underlying the award on the merits. The final award shall also
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in Rule 4 was directed;
those whom the Arbitrator finds to be members of the class, and those who
have elected to opt out of the class.
JAMS, JAMS Class Action Procedures Rule 5 (May 2009), online at
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSClassAction Pro
cedures-2009.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
126 See, for example, American Arbitration Association, Searchable Class Arbitration
Docket, (2013), online at http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices/
casedocket (visited Sept 15, 2013). Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of
Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 Am Rev Intl Arb 435, 447 (2011). Strong, 17 Harv Neg L
Rev at 208 & n 27 (cited in note 75) ("The AAA Supplementary Rules are particularly
influential" because the AAA has administered over 300 class arbitrations, many of them
high profile cases like Stolt-Nielsen).
127 Concepcion raised the question "whether the FAA prohibit[ed] States from
conditioning the enforceability of certain [consumer] arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures." Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744. The
Supreme Court held that California's rule applied the unconscionability analysis
differently in arbitration agreements than when analyzing other contracts and was
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seems evident from a review of the various class arbitration
rules available.
Different institutions and different fields developed
inconsistent approaches to opinion writing. While regulators and
administrators deliberately selected approaches to opinion
writing in the securities and class arbitration areas, the
development of different approaches in other fields may be the
result of happenstance rather than a calculated effort. Many of
the reasons offered to justify the lack of reasoned opinions seem
outdated and unreasonable, particularly as legal issues have
become more prominent in all types of arbitration and as more
one-shot players are compelled to arbitrate. 128 The question
whether opinions are necessary, at least in arbitrations
involving one-shot players, is a timely one. Over the past twenty
years, some of the more prominent -dispute resolution
organizations-like AAA-have moved from discouraging
arbitrators from writing opinions because that might "open
avenues for attack ... by the losing party"1 2 9 to mandating some
form of reasoned opinion. 130 This movement suggests that the
therefore preempted. See id at 1746-47. In reaching this conclusion, the Court detailed
the myriad ways in which class-wide arbitration differed from traditional bilateral
arbitration-the process was slower, more expensive, more procedurally formal, and
more likely to create risks to defendants-to bolster its conclusion that its
implementation would be an obstacle to achieving Congress's goals in enacting the FAA.
See id at 1751-52. Following Concepcion, it is likely that courts will enforce class action
waivers, at least in circumstances where an adequate alternative to litigation is present
(as there was in Concepcion). In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held arbitrators could not rely
on public policy when interpreting a silent arbitration agreement to permit class
arbitration. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S Ct at 1767-68. To order class arbitration, the Court
stated, the arbitrators, when interpreting an agreement silent on the issue of class
arbitration, must find legal rules to support their decision, rather than rely on public
policy. Id. Because legal rules (such as the FAA or state statutes) do not mandate class
arbitration, the Stolt-Nielsen decision effectively precludes arbitrators from interpreting
a silent arbitration agreement to permit class arbitration. Thus, these two decisions,
considered together, may well sound a death knell for class arbitration.
128 At one time, commercial arbitration routinely involved repeat players who
negotiated at arm's length and selected arbitration over litigation as the means to
resolve disputes. No longer are commercial disputes presided over by a panel of three
arbitrators who may have volunteered for the job and who understand the applicable
industry customs that should govern a dispute. Thus, providers should depart from the
traditional commercial arbitration procedural approach.
129 American Arbitration Association, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators *14
(2001), online at https://apps.adr.org/ecenter/neutralResources/A%20Guide%20for%
20Commercial%2OArbitrators.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Stephen A. Hochman,
Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error-An Option to Consider, 13 Ohio St J on Disp
Resol 103, 104-05 (1997) (noting that the AAA has removed certain arbitrators who
insist on explaining their arbitral awards).
1n Note that the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules no longer discourage arbitrator
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tradition or custom of arbitrators not writing opinions may be on
the wane, at least in disputes involving one-shot players like
employees and consumers.
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF A REASONED WRITTEN
OPINION
Judicial decision-making scholarship suggests that opinion
writing serves three purposes: (1) to assist judges in the
decision-making process by forcing them to carefully consider
the facts and law at issue in a particular decision; (2) to further
the existing system of precedent so that future readers can
understand what the rules of law are; and (3) to legitimize the
decisions in the eyes of the parties and the public. As one
professor puts it, "Roughly stated, opinions provide the parties
and the public with assurance that a given decision is not
arbitrary, but rather is the product of the reasoned application
of appropriate legal standards."131 The primary purposes for
arbitrator opinion writing are similar, although not identical.
While encouraging the arbitrator to carefully consider her
decision and legitimizing the decision in the eyes of the parties
and the public are both essential goals of an arbitrator opinion-
writing requirement, 132 the value of promoting the development
opinion writing but also do not encourage it. The prominent arbitration provider
organizations maintain rules mandating fact-finding and reasoning in consumer
disputes. For example, AAA's Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures
Rule C-7(c) states that
[i]n the award, the arbitrator should apply any identified pertinent contract
terms, statutes, and legal precedents. The arbitrator may grant any remedy,
relief or outcome that the parties could have received in court. The award shall
be final and binding. The award is subject to review in accordance with
applicable statutes governing arbitration awards.
American Arbitration Association, Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary
Procedures at C-7(c) (cited in note 118).
"' Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function,
96 Georgetown L J 1283, 1317 (2008).
132 "A well-reasoned opinion can contribute greatly to the acceptance of the award by
the parties by persuading them that the arbitrator understands the case and that his
award is basically sound." Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works at 237 (cited in
note 104). The Supreme Court offered support for this view: "Arbitrators have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award . .. a well-reasoned opinion
tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the
underlying agreement." United Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp,
363 US 593, 598 (1960). See also Hayford, 66 Geo Wash L Rev at 444-47 (cited in note
97) (maintaining that in the long run, commercial arbitration cannot continue without
reasoned opinions that provide transparency and the ability to assess the competency of
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of precedent to guide future behavior is considerably less
certain. At the same time, promoting an arbitral opinion-writing
requirement serves a different goal, that of assisting parties in
arbitrator selection. Written arbitral opinions assist parties in
the selection process because it provides them with better
information about a particular arbitrator's decision-making
process and potential biases. 133 The following sections will
attempt to define what is meant by a "reasoned written opinion"
as well as the potential benefits and drawbacks of arbitrator
opinion writing.134
A. What is a Reasoned Written Opinion?
Before implementation of a reasoned written opinion
requirement, consensus regarding what constitutes a reasoned
written opinion should be developed. To be "reasoned," an
arbitrator's opinion must, at minimum, contain four elements.
First, the arbitrator should identify the issues in dispute. In
doing so, the arbitrator should include relevant facts as well as
the principles the arbitrator intends to apply to the facts.135 The
goal underlying this requirement is that the parties reviewing
the opinion will know that the arbitrator understood the
evidence presented at the hearing and was aware of the customs
the industry uses to resolve this type of dispute. Second, the
arbitrator should use the parties' post-hearing briefs, together
with the evidence presented at the hearing, to identify the
parties' contentions. This section of the opinion demonstrates
that the arbitrator listened to the parties and understood their
arbitrators); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Private Law, Public "Justice" Another Look at
Privacy, Arbitration, and Global E-Commerce, 15 Ohio St J Disp Resol 769, 772-73
(2000) (stating well-reasoned opinions help to combat the ability of institutional repeat
players to "arbitrator-shop" at the expense of a one-time consumer grievant); Roger I.
Abrams, Frances E. Abrams, and Dennis R. Nolan, Arbitral Therapy, 46 Rutgers L Rev
1751, 1779-80 (1994) (stating while losing parties may not agree with the decision, a
reasoned opinion makes sure they understand the arbitrator considered their argument).
133 Elkouri emphasized that opinions may also serve an educational function because
the arbitrator's opinion helps guide their future actions. See Elkouri, How Arbitration
Works at 365-66 (cited in note 104).
14 While more could be done to segregate the different types of decisions arbitrators
make into categories and mandate opinion writing only when absolutely necessary, this
article focuses more generally on benefits and drawbacks of mandating opinion writing.
See Oldfather, 96 Georgetown L J at 1317-20 (cited in note 131). Other issues, such as
how often and when an arbitrator should write an opinion might be left for another day.
13 See Roger I. Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-
Making in Labor Arbitration, 14 UC Davis L Rev 551, 586 (1991).
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arguments.136 Next, the arbitrator must include a decision. In
this part of the opinion, the arbitrator clarifies the scope of the
decision, interprets the evidence, resolves questions of fact,
applies principles of law and custom, and explains why he or she
accepted or rejected the parties' theories. 137 A final section
should describe the award and its consequences for each
party.138
B. Objections to the Written Opinion
The primary objections to the adoption of a written opinion
requirement are cost,13 9 risk to finality, risk to privacy, and
arbitrator incompetence. 1 4 0 The increased use of arbitration in
the consumer and employment context reinforces some of these
concerns because arbitrators, who are paid by the hour, will take
some amount of time to write opinions. In addition, written
opinions may invite more challenges, and, if they do, can
increase costs in defending or prosecuting such challenges. How
can a consumer, whose claim is often small, afford arbitration at
all, much less arbitration where the arbitrator must write a
reasoned written opinion? To the extent that the finality of
arbitration has also played a significant role in limiting costs,
efforts to increase the existence, breadth, and depth of opinion
writing may be more likely to increase costs because, with
greater transparency may come an increasing number of
challenges to the correctness of the award. Finally, to the extent
that arbitrator opinions are published, the confidentiality of the
arbitration process will be undermined. In the consumer context,
136 See id.
... See id at 586-87.
138 See id at 587.
139 See Kaczmarek, 4 Emp Rts & Emp Policy J at 327 (cited in note 97) (noting that
labor arbitrators sometimes take longer to write an opinion than to hear evidence in a
dispute, jeopardizing the speed and low cost that make arbitration an attractive ADR
mechanism).
140 See Calvin William Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory Arbitration Awards, 54
Hastings L J 311, 357 (2003) (indicating that publishing reasoned written opinions will
compromise the confidentiality of the proceedings); Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should
Mandatory Written Opinions be Required in All Securities Arbitrations? The Practical
and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 Am U L Rev 151, 157, 189 (1995)
(similar). Some commentators also worry about arbitrators' ability to make reasoned
decisions, arguing that arbitrators do not understand law particularly well. But see
Weidemaier, 90 NC L Rev at 1097-1101 (cited in note 31) (rejecting this claim in light of
empirical evidence); Levinson, 46 U Mich J L Ref at *33-37 (cited in note 31).
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however, this Article will explain why these purported
drawbacks should not create an obstacle to implementation of a
written reasoned opinion requirement.
1. Increased costs?
With respect to cost, post-Concepcion, it may well be that to
ensure enforceability of an arbitration agreement against a
consumer, the business will have to pay all or most of the
consumer's costs and fees. In Concepcion, the Court implied that
its willingness to enforce AT&T's class action arbitration and
court waiver turned, in part, on the generosity of AT&T's
arbitration clause.141 That clause applied AAA procedural rules,
stated that AT&T would pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims,
gave the consumer the option to bring his claim in small claims
court in lieu of arbitration, permitted the arbitrator to award the
full remedies that would have been available to the consumer in
court, and offered the consumer a $7,500 minimum recovery if
the arbitral award exceeded AT&T's last settlement offer.142
Even before the Court decided Concepcion, though, most
lower courts had held that arbitration clauses could only bind
consumers if the costs of pursuing arbitration were no more
than the costs of going to court.143 In response to these rulings,
the major arbitrator providers, AAA, JAMS, and NAF, created
consumer arbitration guidelines that limit consumers to paying
the equivalent of a court filing fee in order to file for arbitration
and refuse to provide arbitration services if arbitration costs
exceeded court costs.14 4 If opinions were mandated, arbitration
141 See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753.
142 See id at 1744.
14 See Circuit City Stores Inc v Adams, 279 F3d 889, 894 (9th Cir 2002) (holding
requirement that an employee pay half the arbitrator's fee rendered the arbitration
agreement unenforceable); Ball v SFX Broadcasting Inc, 165 F Supp 2d 230, 240 (NDNY
2001) (holding that the likelihood of significant arbitration costs, which would not be
incurred in a judicial forum, rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable); Shankle
v B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado Inc, 163 F3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir 1999)
(noting that employee should not have to pay one-half of arbitrator's $250 per hour fee);
Paladino v Anet Computer Technologies Inc, 134 F3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir 1998) (noting
that employee should not have to pay $2,000 filing fee and one-half the arbitrator's fee);
Cole v Burns International Security Services, 105 F3d 1465, 1484 (DC Cir 1997) (noting
that excessive costs of arbitration would prohibit employee's access to justice).
144 AAA's Consumer Due Process Protocol, Principle 6, states that consumers should
pay only "reasonable costs." The full principle states:
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costs would then include the time for the arbitrator to write the
opinion. Thus, the business, not the consumer, would bear the
cost of the written opinion. One suspects that a consumer who
loses the arbitration, but receives a reasoned written opinion,
would be on her own if she wished to challenge the results of the
opinion.
Even if courts did not limit the consumer's obligation to
what he or she might pay in court, the costs of a written opinion
are not as high as one might initially expect. Useful empirical
evidence exists regarding the costs of adding the reasoned
written opinion procedure. In 2005, NASD, now FINRA,
proposed an amendment to its rules that would require
arbitrators to provide written awards at the request of
consumers' counsel. 145 According to the NASD, the additional
cost of the written explanation was $200.146 NASD offered in its
amendment to pay for half of the costs. 147 Eventually, NASD
chose not to adopt this amendment because those who
commented on the proposal objected to the consumer having the
sole power to request an explained decision. 148 Moreover,
Providers of goods and services should develop ADR programs which entail
reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the dispute,
including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of
goods or services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay. In some
cases, this may require the Provider to subsidize the process.
American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol, Principle 6 (AAA
2007), online at http://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GETFILE&dDocName=
ADRSTG 005014&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (visited Sept 15, 2013).
Although declining to set absolute guidelines, AAA, in its commentary to principle 6,
states:
In some cases, the need to ensure reasonable costs for the Consumer will
require the Provider of goods or services to subsidize the costs of ADR which is
mandated by the agreement. Indeed, many companies today deem it
appropriate to pay most or all of the costs of ADR procedures for claims and
disputes involving individual employees. . . . The Committee considered, and
ultimately rejected, the alternative of establishing specific requirements for
Provider subsidization of the cost of arbitration procedures, other than to
conclude that the Provider of goods and services should ensure the consumer a
basic minimum arbitration procedure appropriate to the circumstances.
Id at Comments to Principle 6 (citations omitted).
145 See generally 70 Fed Reg 41065 (cited in note 113).
146 See id at 41066.
14 Id.
148 See, for example, Margo A. Hasson, Letter to SEC Secretary Florence Harmon
regarding Proposed Rule Change, *2 (FINRA Dec 15, 2008), online at http://www.
finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@regArulfil/documents/rulefilings/p117545.pdf
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commenters expressed concern that the proposal would result in
an increased number of motions to vacate awards based on the
arbitrators' explanations. NASD subsequently withdrew the rule
filing, implementing instead a process called an "explained
decision." The explained decision, which would cost the parties
$400 (although arbitrators could allocate the cost as they see
fit), is only a possibility if both parties request it.149 The
quantification of opinion costs provides consumers with a strong
argument that the additional costs of the written opinion are
relatively small compared to the accrued benefits of the new
practice-greater accountability of arbitrators, claimants'
increased belief in the fairness of the arbitral process, ability of
claimants to change their future behavior to avoid additional
legal difficulty, and ability of either party to present an effective
appeal.
NAF, an arbitrator provider organization, 15 0 adopted a rule
that limits the consumers' responsibility for the cost of a written
opinion, which the consumer can request at his own initiative, to
(visited Sept 15, 2013). FINRA, News Release: New Arbitration Rule Requires Award
Explanations Upon Investor Request (Jan 27, 2005), online at http://www.finra.org/
Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P01 3145 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
149 FINRA Rule 12904(g), applying to decisions after April 16, 2007, states:
(g) Explained Decisions
(1) This paragraph (g) applies only when all parties jointly request an
explained decision.
(2) An explained decision is a fact-based award stating the general reason(s) for
the arbitrators' decision. Inclusion of legal authorities and damage calculations
is not required.
(3) Parties must make any request for an explained decision no later than the
time for the prehearing exchange of documents and witness lists under Rule
12514(d).
(4) The chairperson of the panel will be responsible for writing the explained
decision.
(5) The chairperson will receive an additional honorarium of $400 for writing
the explained decision, as required by this paragraph (g). The panel will
allocate the cost of the chairperson's honorarium to the parties as part of the
final award.
(6) This paragraph (g) will not apply to simplified cases decided without a
hearing under Rule 12800 or to default cases conducted under Rule 12801.
1so NAF is not currently accepting consumer arbitrations and has not accepted
consumer arbitrations since July 19, 2009 (see text accompanying note 115). The rules
discussed in this section were applied to consumer arbitrations filed in 2008 and 2009.
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$100.151 This $100 fee is only allocated to the consumer if the
consumer requests a written decision and the arbitration
agreement that binds the consumer does not address the issue of
a written opinion. Limiting the consumer's payment to $100 is
quite generous-although the fees for a written opinion do not
appear excessive, under the NAF rules, a consumer will know in
advance of his or her request what the extent of his financial
liability will be.
Some Better Business Bureau offices pay their arbitrators
only a $100 honorarium for conducting a hearing and writing a
reasoned opinion.152 Despite the low honorarium, arbitrators are
'5 See National Arbitration Forum, Fee Schedule to Code of Procedure *6 (Aug 2008),
online at http://ww.adrforum.comlusers/naf/resources/2008FeeSchedule-FinalPrintl.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013). NAF rules provide standard fees for Common Claim cases:
The fees for written findings of fact, conclusions of law or reasons for the
Award in a Common Claim case are:
$3,500 or less $200
$3,501 - 13,000 $300
$13,001 - 35,000 $400
$35,001 - 55, 000 $500
$55,001 - 74,999 $750
The above fees are paid as follows:
A Party obligated to pay fees for a Consumer pays the entire fee where an
Arbitration Agreement with a Consumer Party requires written findings of
fact, conclusions of law or reasons for an Award.
A Consumer Party pays $100 (one hundred dollars) and the Party obligated to
pay fees for a Consumer pays the remaining portion where an Arbitration
Agreement does not provide for written findings, conclusions or reasons and a
Consumer Party requests such an Award.
Id.
152 Consider Better Business Bureau, Arbitrator Selection List (Feb 24, 2013) (on file
with author). BBB offices make individual decisions about whether to pay honoraria to
their arbitrators. In Columbus, Ohio, the BBB pays arbitrators a $100 honorarium for
the hearing and opinion writing. Most opinions offer the parties findings of facts and
conclusions of law that are similar to labor arbitration decisions. The low honorarium
does not appear to discourage qualified arbitrators from serving. Of the thirty-one
arbitrators on the roster (including me), sixteen have JD degrees, one has a master's
degree, and the remainder include dispute resolution professionals as well as local
business owners (including owners of construction companies, an auto and truck parts
remanufacturing company owner, and licensed contractors). When a party has a dispute,
the BBB gives the party the arbitrator selection lists, with names and very brief
biographies, and asks them to cross out the name of any person with whom the party
might have a financial, competitive, professional, family, or social relationship and to
rank the remaining in order of preference. See id at *1.
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expected to and do write reasoned awards for the consumers
who bring claims against businesses. Thus, the costs of
obtaining a reasoned written opinion are relatively low and
likely to be borne by the business. In light of the potential
benefits of an opinion, the risk of increased costs seems a minor
concern.
2. Risk to finality?
Another purported benefit of arbitration is that the
arbitrator's decision is final and binding, subject only to very
limited judicial review. Theoretically, limited judicial review
serves to deter appeals of arbitration awards. Even in the few
cases where the award is challenged, courts typically defer to
the arbitrator's award.153 Opponents of arbitrator opinion
writing claim that if arbitrators write opinions, parties will be
more likely to challenge the arbitral outcome whether it is well
or poorly reasoned. A written opinion that offers reasons to
support the award, the argument goes, provides parties the
evidence that might permit them to challenge that award on
appeal.
If, as expected, the courts continue to limit the bases upon
which review may be obtained, it seems relatively unlikely that
parties will be able to mount successful arbitration award
challenges. 154 Although limited review always deterred
arbitration award challenges, the Court's decision in Hall Street,
limited the bases for challenging arbitration awards to those
1sa See Hall Street, 552 US at 586 (holding that vacatur of an arbitral award is
limited to "egregious departures" by the arbitrator from the arbitration agreement and
does not encompass mistakes of law); Michael H. LeRoy and Peter Feuille, Happily
Never After: When Final and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 Harv
Neg L Rev 167, 209-10 (2008) (finding that, in the employment context, arbitration
awards were vacated 6.6 percent of the time at the district court level and 12 percent of
the time at the appellate level).
"' Professor Calvin Sharpe reviewed the rate of appeals from labor arbitration
decisions, which provide reasons for the decisions. See Sharpe, 54 Hastings L J at 356 n
236 (cited in note 140), citing Michael H. LeRoy and Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the
Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 Ohio St J
on Disp Resol 19, 49-50 (2001). According to Sharpe, from 1960-1991, federal district
and appellate courts confirmed approximately three-fourths of the awards. See id.
Similar, although slightly lower numbers of confirmations in the same courts, occurred
between 1991 and 2001 (70 percent for district courts; 66 percent for appellate courts).
Id.
310 [ 2013
271] SOLUTIONs To FEDERALIZATION OF ARBITRATION 311
contained in FAA § 10.15 Following Hall Street, parties may no
longer be able to challenge an arbitration award on the extra-
statutory ground that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law. As a result, a party is less likely to be successful in
overturning an arbitration award. 156
If the arbitration decision reveals poor reasoning,
challenging the result, to the extent that is possible, would seem
to benefit both the party who suffered the adverse result as well
as the public, who would then be more confident that the
outcome was correct and that the arbitration process provided
justice. If the arbitrator's underlying reasoning is
unsupportable, the integrity of the arbitration process would
only be enhanced if the decision were overturned, even if
additional costs were incurred. In addition, it is unclear whether
the advent of written opinions will actually increase challenges.
It may be that a well-reasoned opinion would discourage a
subsequent challenge because the losing party would now
understand the decision-making process and would have a
principled basis by which it might accept the award.157
The relatively low rate of appeals in labor arbitration offers
some support for the argument that reasoned written opinions
reduce appeals. 15 8 While little is known about the reasons why
parties rarely appeal labor arbitration awards, scholars offer
155 See Hall Street, 552 US at 584. See also 9 USC § 10 (enumerating reasons for
vacatur and rehearing).
1s6 See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The "Manifest Disregard
of the Law" Standard *ii (Selected Works Aug 2010), online at http://works.bepress.
com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=michaelleroy (visited Sept 15, 2013)
(finding that state courts are more likely to confirm arbitration awards since the Court
decided Hall Street). Some of Professor LeRoy's findings are that
state appellate courts confirmed more employment awards after Hall Street
was decided on March 3, 2008-88.9 percent (16/18), compared to 70.9 percent
(73/103 awards) from 1975 until Hall Street. Federal district courts confirmed
93.7 percent of awards (164/175) before Hall Street, and 90.9 percent (30/33)
after. Federal appeals courts confirmed awards at a high rate before and after
Hall Street (87.8 percent and 85.7 percent).
Id.
157 Kaczmarek, 4 Emp Rts & Emp Policy J at 297-98 (cited in note 97).
'58 Of course, in the labor context, other factors, including the relatively equal
bargaining power of the parties, fewer bases for challenging awards, and parties' desire
to maintain their ongoing relationship impact the award appeal rate. See Michael H.
LeRoy and Peter Feuille, 13 Harv Neg L Rev at 209-10 (cited in note 153) (stating the
belief that unions and employers restrict their appeal of arbitration awards to maintain
good relationships).
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three potential justifications for the lack of appeals: (1)
likelihood of appeal success is low;15 9 (2) parties want to preserve
their relationship;160 and (3) availability of arbitrator's reasoning
helps parties the accept the result. 6 1 While consumers are likely
less interested in preserving their relationship with a business
than a union would be with respect to an employer, the other
two reasons suggest that, should reasoned written opinions be
required, the likelihood of increased appeals is relatively low.
3. Risk to confidentiality?
Arbitration's proponents frequently identify the privacy of
the proceedings as one of the theoretical advantages of
arbitration over court adjudication. 16 2 If the parties wish their
proceedings to be shielded from public scrutiny, arbitration-a
private forum-is preferable to the courts, which rarely deny
public access. Yet this theoretical advantage is not always fully
realized. Unlike mediation, the confidentiality of which receives
protection as an evidentiary privilege, arbitration proceedings
are understood to be private. However no statute prevents
courts from compelling disclosure or admitting evidence from
the arbitration. Despite this lack of statutory protection, it is
rare for parties to sign a confidentiality agreement before
arbitration to ensure that the proceedings are kept confidential.
The understood notion of privacy might seem beneficial for
19 LeRoy and Feuille found that federal courts are also quite deferential to
employment discrimination arbitration awards. Id at 185. Federal circuit courts affirmed
arbitration awards in these cases 88 percent of the time while federal district courts
affirmed arbitration awards a whopping 93.4 percent of the time. Id. The study reviewed
post-award disputes between an individual employee and employer, who were not
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id at 182. The authors reviewed 240
individual employment arbitration awards appealed either to federal circuit or district
courts between 1970 and 2006. See id at 186.
16 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 Hastings L J 1199, 1235-36 (2000).
161 See United Steelworkers, 363 US at 598 ("[A] well-reasoned opinion tends to
engender confidence in the integrity of the process.").
162 Courts often point to privacy and confidentiality as unique features of
arbitration. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S Ct at 1776. Professor Amy Schmitz identifies the
privacy, but not confidentiality, of arbitration as creating some potential advantages and
disadvantages for parties to arbitration. See Amy J. Schmitz, Assuming Silence in
Arbitration, New Jersey Lawyer 13, 13-15 (Apr 2011) (noting that while arbitration is
private, it is not necessarily confidential). For further discussion of the benefits and
drawbacks of privacy in arbitration, see generally Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the
Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U Kan L Rev 1211 (2006); Richard C. Reuben,
Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U Kan L Rev 1255 (2006).
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parties who wish to avoid the airing of their dirty laundry in
public. Yet the notion of privacy in arbitration may mislead
parties, particularly one-shot players, into believing that what
they say in arbitration will be kept quiet when, in the absence of
a confidentiality agreement, parties' testimony may be revealed
either in court or in the media.
For the one-shot player, the benefits of confidentiality or
privacy may not be especially important. In fact, it may be the
case that the lack of privacy protection in arbitration is actually
a benefit for the one-shot player. If the one-shot player believes
that the arbitration process or the result is unfair (for whatever
reason), the absence of a confidentiality agreement may
facilitate the individual's interest in sharing information with
the press, other litigants, or whomever else might be interested.
4. Arbitrators incapable of writing reasoned opinions?
One of the major objections to the use of arbitration to
resolve noncontractual claims, particularly claims requiring the
interpretation of a statute or other external law, has been that
the existing pool of arbitrators is not competent to resolve such
claims. 163 If arbitrators are not capable of analyzing and
deciding statutory claims, the argument goes, it would seem
improper to expand the arbitrator's role to include external law
interpretation. And if arbitrators cannot properly interpret the
law, they are also unlikely to write well-reasoned opinions.
Despite considerable historical support for this position, 164
the Court has, rather rapidly, changed its view about
163 See Barrentine v Arkansas-Best Freight System Inc, 450 US 728, 743-45 (1981)
(extending the rule that unions cannot waive statutory rights under Title VII to the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and stating that in labor arbitration, arbitrator's role is to
interpret and apply the law of the shop). See also David E. Feller, Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16 Hofstra Labor & Emp L J 53, 73 (1998)
(discussing individual public law claims and noting that arbitrability presumption
should not exist when a collective bargaining agreement exists); Martin H. Malin,
Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 SLU L J 77,
83-88 (1996) (discussing statutory employment claims and the difference between
grievance and general arbitration).
1A See, for example, Brunet, 62 Brooklyn L Rev at 1484 (cited in note 47) (opining
that securities arbitration is lawless); Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as
They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 Cardozo L Rev 991, 1040
(2002) (observing that arbitrators impose liability on brokers even when the law clearly
does not support the result); Kenneth S. Abraham and JW Montgomery, III, The
Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 Conn Ins L J 355, 357 (2003) (arguing that insurance
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arbitrators' capabilities.165 In Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp,'66 and again in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v Pyett,167 the Court
approved arbitrators deciding statutory claims (Gilmer)168 and
applying external law (Pyett).169 Yet the Court's embrace of
arbitrator competence is not reflected in most of the academic
commentary. Some academic commentators emphasize that
arbitrators, particularly those who decide labor disputes, are
experts in the "law of the shop" rather than the "law of the
land."170 For whatever reason and without citing any empirical
evidence, academic commentators seem unwilling to adapt their
views about arbitrators' roles and expertise to those of the courts
even though the Court has made it abundantly clear that it has
faith in arbitrators' ability to interpret the law. 171
arbitration is contractual "lawlessness"); Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration:
The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J Am Arb 1, 11 (2003) (noting that arbitrators
cannot make new law or establish precedent); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn L Rev 703, 725 (1999)
(concluding that arbitrators do not follow the law).
15 See generally Wilko v Swan, 364 US 427 (1953) (arguing that arbitrators were
neither legal experts nor capable of adjudicating legal claims).
1'6 500 US 20 (1991). In Gilmer, the Court explicitly rejected the "judicial suspicion
of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals." Id at 34 n 5,
quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrusler-Plymouth lnc, 473 US 614, 626-27
(1985).
167 556 US 247 (2009).
1c See Gilmer, 500 US at 34 n 5.
169 See Pyett, 556 US at 247. The Supreme Court's view about arbitrator authority
has evolved rather quickly-from Gardner-Denver to Wright to Pyett, the Court has
moved from thinking that an arbitrator who applies external law is exceeding his
authority to a view that a labor arbitrator asked to arbitrate a public law must do so. See
Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36, 53-54 (1974); Wright v Universal Maritime
Service Corp, 525 US 70, 79 (1998); Pyett, 556 US at 255. Some academic commentators,
notably Marion Crain, are advocating for an expanded role for the union in statutory
rights cases. Professor Crain emphasizes, though, the importance of enhancing the
statutory controls on unions if additional power were conferred on them. See Marion
Crain and Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 Cal L Rev 1767, 1839-41 (2001)
(discussing discrimination in the workplace).
10 Martin H. Malin and Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor
Arbitrator, 21 Ohio St J Disp Resol 199, 205 (2005). The EEOC takes this position, too.
See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, Rogers v New York University, No 99-9172, *11-12 (filed
Feb 22, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 WL 34002290). The National Employment
Lawyers Association's Amicus Brief takes the same position. See Brief for the National
Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee,
Rogers v New York University, No 99-9172 (filed Feb 15, 2000) (available on Westlaw at
2000 WL 34002295).
"7 Some unions are warming to the idea that an arbitrator may resolve statutory
discrimination claims if the parties have empowered him to do so. See Amicus Brief of
271] SOLUTIONS TO FEDERALIZATION OF ARBITRATION 315
More recently, however, three legal scholars conducted
empirical analyses of arbitrator's decision making and use of
precedent. In his article analyzing arbitrator use of precedent,172
Professor Weidemaier found inaccurate the common wisdom
that arbitrators neither follow nor make precedent. Examining
arbitrators' citation practices in securities, labor, employment,
and class action arbitration, Weidemaier found that arbitrators,
particularly in employment and class action arbitration cases,
"routinely" wrote lengthy, reasoned awards, spending
considerable time analyzing the extant legal issues and
extensively using precedent.173 While some of the cited
precedent came from other arbitrators' opinions, the majority of
cited precedent came from published judicial opinions. Professor
Weidemaier concluded that the available evidence supported the
theory that arbitrators and judges engage in similar types of
decision making and opinion writing.
Professor Drahozal reviewed the existing empirical studies
in 2006 and found that arbitrators, when surveyed, reveal the
same philosophy about following the law when rendering a
decision as judges.174 Drahozal reported that judicial reversal
rates of arbitration awards, even when reviewed de novo, are
remarkably similar to appellate court reversal rates for lower
court decisions. 75 Thus, it would seem inappropriate to conclude
AFL-CIO, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v Pyett, No 07-581, *9 (filed July 18, 2008) (available on
Westlaw at 2008 WL 2817677). The AFL-CIO argued:
[W]here an individual employee-grievant has requested that the union
arbitrate his statutory discrimination claim through the collectively bargained
grievance procedure, we can see no reason why the arbitrator's decision of that
statutory claim should not be given the same binding effect on the individual
employee who requested arbitration as an arbitration award issued pursuant
to the sort of individual arbitration agreement sanctioned by Gilmer.
Id.
172 Professor Weidemaier reviewed over 800 arbitration opinions, evenly divided
among securities, labor, class action, and employment cases. Weidemaier, 90 NC L Rev
at 1105 (cited in note 31).
17 Id at 1095, 1139 (noting that outside of securities disputes, arbitrators "wrote
reasonably lengthy decisions that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and made
ample use of precedent"). In addition, Weidemaier found that, outside of labor
arbitration, the "overwhelming majority" of awards cite judicial precedent. Id at 1140.
He found the similarity between arbitrators' opinions and judicial opinions "striking." Id.
174 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loyola LA L Rev 187,
214 (2006).
175 See id.
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that arbitrators understand the law any less than other
potential decision makers.1 7 6
Professor Levinson's work also rejects the common wisdom
that arbitrators, particularly in the unionized sector, are
incapable of analyzing external or statutory law and explaining
their application of law to facts in a well-reasoned opinion. In
her study of 160 labor arbitration awards involving employment
discrimination claims, Professor Levinson found that "[tihe
majority of cases reach outcomes that appear defensible under
the governing law, even if the reader does not agree with the
outcome."177 Professor Levinson concluded that a mandatory
system in which labor arbitrators decide employment
discrimination disputes, like the one at issue in Pyett, is just.1 78
Despite this conclusion, Professor Levinson nevertheless
recommends increased procedural protections in arbitration,
including access to greater discovery and recourse for
arbitrators' clearly erroneous statements of law. 179
Arbitrator quality is also quite high. My recent analysis of
the Better Business Bureau (BBB) roster in Columbus, Ohio, is
revealing. These thirty-some arbitrators, who hear disputes and
write reasoned opinions for a $100 honorarium, share
credentials that are quite impressive. As it turns out, many
lawyers, law professors, and other professionals enjoy
arbitrating, even if the pay is low, so long as they are not asked
to arbitrate too frequently. 80 FINRA operates on a similar
16 Drahozal also reported on a study, conducted by Patricia Greenfield, which
reviewed 106 cases decided between 1983 and 1985 where at least one party had filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. Id at 195-96, citing Patricia A. Greenfield,
How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 Indus & Labor Rel Rev 683, 687 (1992).
Greenfield found in her study that although half of the arbitrators cited external law in
their opinions, most of the arbitrators' analysis of external law was cursory or
conclusory. See id. Greenfield's study would seem to be of limited value given its age and
focus on unfair labor practice charges. Further empirical studies, particularly of labor
arbitration awards, would be helpful in assessing whether or not arbitrators follow the
law, particularly when statutory discrimination claims are at issue.
'" Levinson, 46 U Mich J L Reform at 33 (cited in note 31). Of the 111 cases
involving statutes, seventy-one (64 percent) cited legal authority other than a statute,
thirteen cited EEOC regulations or guidelines, and twenty-six cited other arbitration
decisions. Id at 32-33. Forty decisions cited the relevant statute but no legal authority.
Id at 33.
178 See id at 49.
179 See id at 52.
18o Consider Better Business Bureau, Arbitrator Selection List (cited in note 152).
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model, although they offer higher pay to arbitrators. 18 1 Many
arbitrators do not rely on their arbitrator stipends for their full
salary. As a result, the lower pay FINRA and BBB offer does not
appear to detract from arbitrator quality. As more and more law
schools provide training for future mediators and arbitrators, it
is likely that the quality of arbitrators will continue to improve
without a requirement that arbitrators become highly paid.
Longstanding views that arbitrators are incapable of
interpreting and applying external and statutory law to resolve
disputes in arbitration are outmoded. Arbitrators are frequently
legally trained and are almost always very experienced in law
and/or dispute resolution. The Court is right to have faith in
arbitrators' ability to analyze difficult legal issues, apply
precedent to help resolve a dispute and write an opinion that
reflects these efforts. Arbitrators are capable decision makers
who can competently resolve issues, whether straightforward or
complex.182
C. Benefits of Reasoned Written Opinions-All this for $100?
Numerous benefits attach when arbitrators write opinions,
particularly when the dispute involves a business and a
consumer.183 From the consumer's perspective, a written opinion
provides valuable information about how an arbitrator reached
her decision. This information may aid the consumer in future
181 FINRA's pay scale provides only modest compensation to arbitrators. Pursuant to
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 12902 for Customer Disputes and Rule 13902
for Industry Disputes, a hearing session, which is any meeting between the parties and
the arbitrator(s) of four hours or less, costs the parties, for a claim greater than
$500,000, $1,200 for a session with three arbitrators ($400 per arbitrator per session-if
the parties opt for one arbitrator, they must pay $450 per hour for any claim over
$10,000.01). See FINRA Rule 12902. The arbitrator(s) have discretion to determine the
amount of each hearing session fee that each party must pay.
182 Continued use of arbitration may result in a transfer of some types of disputes
from litigation to arbitration. This transfer could create problems since courts provide a
deferential review process to arbitration awards, shielding arbitrator mistakes from
reversal. Elsewhere I have advocated for increasing judicial review of arbitration awards
involving statutory or external law. If businesses continue to use arbitration to resolve
consumer disputes, it may be that Congress should consider altering the existing
standards of review in § 10 of the FAA.
1sa This is not to say that written opinions benefit parties, decision makers, or the
public in every case. Consider Oldfather, 96 Georgetown L J 1283 (cited in note 131).
Yet, on balance, the research supports the belief that writing increases deliberation,
which, in most cases, provides better decision making. See id at 1317-39; Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 Cornell L Rev 1, 36-37 (2007).
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arbitrator selection. 184 In addition, the reasoned written opinion
legitimizes the process by providing greater decision-making
transparency to the consumer.185  From the business's
perspective, the opinion aids in arbitrator selection and
legitimization of the use of the process and provides the business
with greater information about trends in decision making that
might be beneficial when planning for the future. A written
opinion benefits the arbitrator (as well as the parties) because
writing the opinion increases deliberation and, thus, improves
the quality of the decision.186 Writing the decision helps the
arbitrator think through issues, avoid arbitrary decisions and
offer more fulsome explanations than an oral or limited written
decision would.
184 Professors Barbara Black and Jill Gross cited this reason, among others, as an
appropriate justification for the introduction of explained decisions in securities
arbitration. See Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross, Letter to SEC Secretary Florence
Harmon *3 (Nov 20, 2008), online at http: //www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2008-
051/finra2008051-1.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013). The professors stated "because explained
awards will provide parties with some insight into how arbitrators resolve controversies,
they may provide valuable information for parties to use when ranking and striking
arbitrators during arbitrator selection in future cases." Id.
185 Professors Black and Gross also identified the need for transparency in decision
making as a justification for the institution of an explained decision requirement.
Interestingly, the arbitration parties themselves, the customers, also stated that they
would be more satisfied with securities arbitration outcomes if they had an explanation
of the award. See Black and Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration at
*39 (cited in note 112) (55.48 percent of customers stated that they would be more
satisfied with the outcome of their arbitration had they received an explanation of the
award).
186 Most scholars focus on judges, rather than arbitrators, when discussing the
benefits of deliberation. The principles underlying decision making, though, would be
unlikely to change whether the decision maker were an arbitrator or a judge. One author
explained that in the process of writing an opinion, a judge must "clarify his thoughts as
he reduces them to paper." It is the "process of reducing one's ideas to writing" that
enables a decision maker to assess whether or not his reasoning is sound. Mary Kate
Kearney, The Propriety of Poetry in Judicial Opinions, 12 Widener L J 597, 599 (2003). A
judge advising law clerks stated that:
Judges write opinions for many reasons: to help think through the issues; to
explain to the parties, their counsel, and the appellate courts how and why the
case was decided; to advance the law's development; to provide consistency by
setting precedent; ... and to convince a possibly unfavorable audience that the
judge wrote a correct decision.
Gerald Lebovits and Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Advice to Law Clerks: How to Draft Your
First Judicial Opinion, 36 Westchester Bar J 29, 29 (2009).
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1. Arbitrator selection process enhanced.
Reasoned decisions provide insight into the arbitrator's
deliberative process. By reviewing the reasoned decision, a party
is likely to develop a deeper understanding of the arbitrator's
thinking process. This greater understanding will aid the party
when selecting arbitrators in the future.187 Moreover, arbitrators
who decide a particular case one way on one occasion are likely
to decide a similar case the same way on another day. Most
arbitrators want to be consistent in the way they adjudicate
disputes188-not only does the writing of opinions reveal the way
arbitrators make decisions but also aids them in future decisions
to remind them of the way they approached a particular problem
in the past. This knowledge also helps parties in the selection
process.
In addition, reasoned written opinions provide useful
information to parties about an arbitrator's abilities. As
Professor Hayford stated, "in most cases [ ] the only indicia of
... arbitrator competencies are the manner in which the neutral
conducts the hearing and the perceived correctness of the result
reached."189 This meager information provides parties little basis
for making sound arbitrator selection decisions. Parties are in a
much better position to evaluate the arbitrator's abilities if he or
she is required to write a reasoned opinion.190
2. Transparency in the decision-making process.
Parties want to understand why they have won or lost in
arbitration. 191 Reasoned opinions provide parties this
understanding and, in many cases, help the losing party accept
187 This conclusion is likely to be true even if the consumer is a one-shot player.
Consumer counsel share information about arbitrators-this ability to share information
is enhanced by easy access to the internet.
s8 Weidemaier, 90 NC L Rev at 1110 (cited in note 31).
1'9 Stephen Hayford and Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 Ohio St J Disp Res 343, 403 (1995).
190 See Gibbons, 15 Ohio St J on Disp Resol at 772-73 (cited in note 132) (noting that
well-reasoned opinions help to combat the ability of institutional repeat players to
"arbitrator-shop[ I" at the expense of a one-time consumer grievant).
191 Even AAA concedes that parties sometimes want these decisions. Raymond G.
Bender Jr, Critical First Steps in Complex Commercial Arbitration *7 (American
Arbitration Association 2009), online at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=
ADRSTG_011424 (visited Sept 15, 2013).
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an adverse award.19 2 Availability of a reasoned opinion may also
serve to strengthen the parties' faith in the integrity of the
arbitral process because the parties are able to see for
themselves that the arbitrator considered the relevant facts and,
if applicable, legal rules. In addition, when arbitrators draft
reasoned awards, the parties may review the award to ensure
that their facts and theories were heard and, hopefully,
understood.193
The theory that parties want explained decisions and
greater transparency in decision making is borne out by the
available empirical evidence. Professors Barbara Black and Jill
Gross, who initially contended that written opinions, at least in
the securities industry, would not be beneficial, changed their
minds in light of their empirical study, revealing that that
customers wanted explanations of the arbitration awards and
believed they would be more satisfied if they received such
explanations.194
One proponent of written arbitration awards, Stephen
Hayford, theorizes that parties are interested in and would
benefit from greater transparency in arbitrator decision making.
Without reasoned decisions, parties have no "reliable indicia of
whether the arbitrator's decision was founded on a full
understanding of the material facts and a proper interpretation
and application of the relevant . .. law."1 9 5 In the absence of a
reasoned decision, losing parties will likely be dissatisfied with
the arbitration process, and, more problematically, attempt to
vacate the arbitration award.196 In addition, as Professor Reuben
notes, reasoned opinions "help explain and legitimize the work
of the court in the eyes of the parties and the public, thus
192 Kaczmarek stated that "[a]ll sides generally agree that a sound opinion
contributes to the acceptance of the award by persuading the parties that the arbitrator
thoughtfully considered the claim and came to a well-reasoned decision." Kaczmarek, 4
Emp Rts & Emp Pol J at 297 (cited in note 97).
19s Consider Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 Harv CR-
CL L Rev 297, 299 (1982).
'4 Compare Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do
Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U Cin L Rev 415, 450-51 (2003) (arguing
that explained decisions are not useful), with Black and Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of
Securities Arbitration at *39 (cited in note 112) (55.48 percent of customers stated that
they would be more satisfied with the outcome of their arbitration had they received an
explanation of the award).
19 See Hayford, 66 Geo Wash L Rev at 446 (cited in note 97).
'9 See id.
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supporting the rule of law that is essential to the exercise of
democratic governance."19 7
3. Enhancing the decision-making process-lessons from
cognitive psychology.
Those who study decision making often emphasize that
when a decision maker must write a reasoned decision, he or she
will analyze the facts and applicable rules more critically and
take more care in drafting his or her decision. 198 In addition, if a
decision maker is aware that she will be expected to write a
reasoned opinion, she will pay better attention to the evidence
as it is presented at the hearing. Knowing that others will read
the opinion will also provide the decision maker an incentive to
take greater care in reaching her decision.
While these beliefs are widely held, and have been so for a
long time, only recently have scholars turned to the field of
cognitive psychology to better understand the decision-making
process and find support for these intuitions. Cognitive
psychologists analyze the methods individuals use to make
decisions and offer suggestions about how to improve decision
quality. 99 Cognitive psychologists believe that individuals
utilize heuristics to assist them when evaluating available
choices. These heuristics are shortcuts that individuals use to
make the decision-making process less cognitively demanding. 200
An individual's use of various heuristics to make certain kinds of
decisions will, most of the time, result in sufficiently accurate
decisions. Yet, cognitive psychologists have discovered that
individuals use these shortcuts even when their use results in
inaccurate decision making. For example, the availability
heuristic describes the situation where an individual correlates
his ability to recall a type of event with the likelihood that the
event will occur. In other words, if one can recall an event easily,
one is likely to believe that the event will reoccur more often
197 Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors
Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 Nev L J 271, 281 (2007). Although Reuben refers to
courts, logically, his reasoning would extend to the arbitral forum.
19s Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating
System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U Kan L Rev 985, 1056 (2012).
'9 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L Rev 486, 491-92 (2002).
200 See id at 494-95.
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than is statistically supportable. Thus, the availability heuristic
leads a decision maker to overpredict the likelihood of events
that are easy for him to recall.201
Together with availability, numerous other heuristics help
individuals make quick and relatively accurate decisions every
day about where to eat dinner and what route to take to work.
Yet, the use of these heuristics to make more complex decisions
may lead to poor results. Fortunately, recent research in the
field has identified additional heuristics that individuals use to
reduce the decisional error resulting from interaction among the
various biases. These might be called "modifying heuristics."
They are heuristics that operate on top of other heuristics to
correct the bias that results from use of those initial heuristics.
Research on one of these modifying heuristics-known as
accountability-suggests that the more likely an individual is to
be held accountable for his decisions, the more likely he will be
to make efforts to improve the quality of his decision making. 202
In other words, the greater a decision maker's responsibility for
a judgment, the more careful and complete will be his use of the
relevant evidence. 203 Accountability also reduces the extent to
which decision makers are subject to some of the various other
types of psychological biases described above. 204 In addition,
accountability causes a decision maker to be more careful with
his decision if he may suffer negative consequences because he
failed to justify the decision by providing a satisfactory
20' Mark Seidenfeld offers an example of the impact of the availability heuristic in
the context of EPA rulemaking. According to Seidenfeld, legal scholars believe that
"virtually every rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
challenged in court." Id at 501. The statistics reveal that only 3 to 26 percent of EPA
rules are challenged. See id. 'Th[is] difference between [ ] folklore and reality," states
Seidenfeld, "may well reflect that rules subject to challenge are much more salient in the
minds of members of the agency and hence easier for them to recall, leading agency
members to believe that 80 percent or more of all rules were challenged." Id.
202 See David M. Sanbonmatsu, Sharon A. Akimoto, and Earlene Biggs,
Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J Pers &
Soc Psych 892, 896-97 (1993). See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka, and
Richard Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability:
Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J Pers & Soc Psych 632 (1989).
2W Sanbonmatsu, 65 J Pers & Soc Psych at 896-97 (cited in note 202).
204 These other biases often lead a decision maker to inferior decisions. The bias
heuristics include attribution (the tendency to attribute one's beliefs and opinions to
others), overconfidence (experts tend to be overconfident), and availability (the ability to
recall similar events to assist in the current decision). Decision makers can be affected
by other biases as well. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and
Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 Duke L J 1059, 1062-64 (2001).
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explanation for it.205 Although accountability may have other
effects on a decision maker, cognitive psychologists agree that
one effect of accountability is to increase the likelihood that a
decision maker will consider all relevant evidence and "modify
initial impressions in response to contradictory evidence." 206
In the arbitration context, the accountability heuristic
suggests that an arbitrator who is obligated to provide parties
with a reasoned written opinion will be more careful in
evaluating the evidence and less likely to be influenced by
inherent decision-making biases. This consideration will have
two effects. First, the arbitrator will be aware that the parties
will be likely to view him negatively (that is, hold him
accountable) if the reasons the arbitrator provides for his
decision are unsatisfactory. Thus, accountability will lead
arbitrators to be more careful when providing justifications for
their decisions. Second, a written opinion may make judicial
review more likely, but also make it more likely that judicial
review will be meaningful. Thus, the possibility of judicial
review is a further accountability check that will limit an
arbitrator's tendency to rely inappropriately on biases rather
than analysis. 207
Another lesson from cognitive psychology is that decision
makers tend to use intuition, another heuristic, to develop quick
answers to judgment problems that deliberation can potentially
"endorse, correct, or override." 208 Professors Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Judge Andrew Wistrich conducted an
empirical study of trial judges' decision-making processes to test
205 Id at 1064.
206 Tetlock, 57 J Pers & Soc Psych at 632 (cited in note 202).
207 Professor Mark Seidenfeld examined the accountability heuristic in the context of
arbitrary and capricious judicial review of administrative agency rulemaking. According
to Seidenfeld, judicial review creates agency accountability. This accountability reduces
the decision maker's reliance on shortcuts, which often represent use of inappropriate
biases. Arbitrary and capricious review reduces the impact of individual biases in agency
decision making and creates the proper "incentives for agency staff to take appropriate
care and to avoid many systematic biases when formulating rules and ushering them
through the rulemaking process." Seidenfeld, 87 Cornell L Rev at 547-48 (cited in note
199).
208 Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel
Kahneman, eds, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49, 51
(Cambridge 2002). Intuitive thinking can "lead to severe and systematic errors." Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Science 1124, 1124 (1974).
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this theory. Their research, which involved administering the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)209 to a group of 295 Florida
circuit court judges, revealed that judges use intuition when
making decisions but that, in some instances, intuition led to
inaccurate choices. 210 In those cases, the authors concluded,
judges needed to override their erroneous intuitions with
deliberation. 211 Using Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick's
work in psychology, together with the evidence gathered from
their empirical study of judges' decision making, the authors
concluded that one way the justice system could encourage this
necessary deliberation would be to require judges to write
opinions more frequently. 2 12 According to the authors, "writing
opinions could induce deliberation that otherwise would not
occur.... [T]he discipline of opinion writing might enable well-
meaning judges to overcome their intuitive, impressionistic
reactions. The process of writing might challenge the judge to
assess a decision more carefully, logically, and deductively."213
Applying these findings to arbitrators would likely yield
similar results. 214 Arbitrators, like trial judges, tend to develop
259 The CRT is a three-item test that is designed to separate intuitive and
deliberative decision making. In other words, the test is designed to assess an
individual's ability to resist answering a question with the first response that comes to
one's mind (which, in the case of the test, will be the wrong answer). Guthrie, Rachlinski,
and Wistrich, 93 Cornell L Rev at 35 (cited in note 183).
210 See id at 13, 31.
21n See id at 32-33.
212 Id at 36-37. The authors offer additional means for encouraging deliberation-
providing judges with more time to make decisions, more training and feedback to
encourage deliberative decision making, and scripts and checklists that they could use at
each step in the process so that they will be less likely to use intuition when the result of
intuition would be erroneous decisions. See id at 35-42.
213 Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich, 93 Cornell L Rev at 36-37 (cited in note 183).
" In a subsequent study, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich attempted to determine
whether specialization improved decision making quality. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Chris Guthrie, and Andrew Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 BU L Rev
1227, 1257 (2006). Their study of federal bankruptcy judges was inconclusive. As they
stated,
[W]hether specialization improves judicial decision making remains an open
question.. .. [TLhe decision-making performance of specialized judges, at least
those that we studied here, appears, at a minimum, to be on par with the
decision-making performance of generalist judges. Specialization, in other
words, does not appear to decrease the quality of judicial decision making, even
if it does not lead inexorably to improved decision making.
Id at 1257. Arbitrators, with their (typically) greater specialized knowledge, might seem
more like bankruptcy judges than trial judges. It would appear, however, that their
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intuitive reactions to evidence presented. Like the process trial
judges use, the process of drafting an opinion might encourage
the arbitrator to reach her decision more carefully and
deliberately. Thus, the arbitrator would be more likely to avoid
erroneous outcomes when writing an opinion than when not
writing an opinion. Like the justice system, dispute resolution
providers, who administer the modern arbitration system,
should, to the extent possible, make efforts to increase the use of
deliberation, rather than intuition, in decision making. 215 One
way to accomplish this goal would be to require arbitrators to
write reasoned written opinions.
While cognitive psychology cannot quantify the benefit of
making a decision maker accountable, it does suggest that more
accurate decisions and meaningful judicial review in appropriate
cases are a likely outcome of increasing decision-maker
accountability and deliberation. The next question, then, is to
what extent the benefits of accountability are outweighed, if at
all, by the increased cost of written opinions as well as the loss
of confidentiality and potential increased risk of judicial review.
Good empirical evidence exists regarding the costs of adding the
reasoned written opinion procedure. FINRA considered adopting
a rule that would require arbitrators to provide written awards
at the request of consumers' counsel at a cost of $200.216
National Arbitration Forum (NAF) and AAA adopted similar
rules for consumer disputes-requiring reasoned opinions while
limiting the consumers' responsibility for the cost of such
opinions to $100.217 Thus, it appears that the increased cost of a
written opinion is minimal.
Concerns about confidentiality and risk of increased judicial
review also seem overblown. In consumer arbitration, it is rarely
the consumer who is interested in confidentiality. In fact, often
the consumer is interested in publicizing information about the
arguably greater similarity to bankruptcy judges would make little difference in the
quality of their decision-making process. Thus, the analogy to trial judges makes sense.
215 This conclusion mirrors Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich's conclusions with
respect to the justice system. Acknowledging that intuition might be a benefit in some
cases, the authors nevertheless conclude that "[tihe justice system should take what
steps it can to increase the likelihood that judges will decide cases in a predominantly
deliberative, rather than a predominately intuitive, way." Guthrie, Rachlinski, and
Wistrich, 93 Cornell L Rev at 43 (cited in note 183).
216 See 70 Fed Reg at 41066 (cited in note 113). See also text accompanying notes
113 and 149.
217 See text accompanying note 151.
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arbitration process and outcome. At any rate, the interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of consumer arbitrations is very
low on the consumer side. Additional publicity, obtained through
reasoned written opinions, will undoubtedly make the entire
arbitral process more transparent and, as a result, potentially
more acceptable to the consumers required to use it and to the
public at large who seem skeptical about it. It is unclear
whether requiring arbitrators to issue reasoned written opinions
will increase judicial review of arbitration awards. Following
Hall Street, the ability to challenge arbitration awards
decreased to the point where it may well be that parties can only
challenge arbitration awards for procedural irregularity. Even if
parties are ultimately able to claim that an arbitrator exceeded
the scope of her powers in issuing an award (a potentially
substantive basis for review), parties who lose in arbitration but
understand why they lost because they received a reasoned
opinion may be less likely to appeal. Given the lack of empirical
evidence on this issue, dispute resolution providers should
engage in the experiment in reasoned opinion writing because it
may prove to be a useful and beneficial idea.
Finally, evidence supports the longstanding belief that
arbitrators are capable of adjudicating both facts and law.
Requiring a reasoned opinion of arbitrators in consumer
arbitrations will likely enhance arbitrators' abilities and weed
out those arbitrators who cannot rise to the task.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federalization of arbitration law is virtually complete.
Few unanswered questions remain. If the Supreme Court
remains true to its new definition of arbitration articulated in
Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen, states will have little ability to
regulate the arbitration process. The CFPB may limit or ban
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial
services transactions, but such future regulations depend on
politics and represent only a possibility. Congress has shown
little interest in regulating arbitration in the consumer area.
Thus, any change to the arbitral process will come, if at all, from
the private sector. The most likely candidates for achieving
reform are the arbitration providers themselves. Unlikely to
eliminate the use of arbitration, the providers instead should
attempt to engage in experimentation with different due process
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protections in arbitration-they have already begun this effort
through the adoption of consumer due process protocols and
through limitations on costs and fees that consumers must pay
in order to arbitrate their claims. Although other protections
might also be beneficial, providers should consider requiring
arbitrators to draft reasoned written opinions. At relatively low
cost, this change to current arbitral procedures, already in place
to some degree with some providers, will increase the
transparency and legitimacy of the arbitration process for
consumers, providing them with clearer justifications for
adverse decisions and the basis, if needed, for challenging the
decisions. Given that arbitrators are fully capable of resolving
the kinds of issues that may arise in consumer arbitration, this
relatively simple change will provide benefits to consumers,
businesses, and arbitrators, as well as to the public at large. It is
a change whose time has come.
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